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Abstract
The basic premise of this thesis is that uncertainty creates opportunities and that dealing
with uncertainty demands a structured and simple framework. Uncertainty has many different
sources and for approaching issues with high level of uncertainty a manager should try to
understand this sources in a structured way.
This work I address the multiple issues involved in the formulation of strategies for the
development of new businesses based on the core competencies of the firm and taking advantage
of the environmental trends and opportunities. Relevant findings of different scholars and
authors that have addressed development of new businesses, implications of diversification,
management of uncertainty, and financial valuation are analyzed. It is proposed a framework to
deal with uncertainty in a structured and simple way.
For a case study, Sun Microsystems' Jini Technology was chosen, given that it represents
a technological disruption generating high levels of uncertainty in the computing industry. It is a
technology oriented to take advantage of the computing and communications infrastructure and
to increase value for the customer. The proposed structured framework is applied to the case of
study as an exercise to show a practical use in developing new business and to demonstrate its
validity.
Thesis Supervisor: James Utterback, Ph.D. Professor of Management and Engineering,
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Introduction
The basic premise of this thesis is that uncertainty creates opportunities and, certainly
dealing with uncertainty is a difficult task for managers. Uncertainty has many different sources
and for approaching issues with high level of uncertainty a manager should try to understand this
sources in a structured way.
In this work I address, through a bibliographical research, the multiple issues involved in
the formulation of strategies for the development of new businesses based on the core
competencies of the firm and taking advantage of the environmental trends and opportunities.
Chapters 1, 2 and 3 are dedicated to analyze relevant findings of different scholars and authors
that have addressed development of new businesses, implications of diversification, management
of uncertainty, and financial valuation. Also I propose a framework to deal with uncertainty in a
structured and simple way. These chapters provide a theoretical frame before analyzing a case
that involves high uncertainty and applying a methodological approach to manage uncertainty.
Sources for uncertainty are various and its impact in an industry can be at different levels.
In chapters 4 and 5 a case where uncertainty raises from a technological disruption is studied.
Network computing has been a movement that its roots can be traced back to the 1970's,
however it could become a reality by the dawn of the XXI Century with the development of
adequate protocols. Such is the case of Jini technology from Sun Microsystems that allows the
interoperability of different platforms and generations of devices over a network. This represents
a shift in the way that business its done in the computer industry and sensible alterations in the
value chains of the industry.
For dealing with uncertainty a manager should look at various elements. In Chapter 6 I
apply the framework developed in Chapter 3 using as example the technological disruption and
its implications for competition of involved companies analyzed in chapters 4 and 5. The main
objective of the exercise is to show a practical use of the structured framework for dealing with
uncertainty based on the case analysis made about the disruptions in technology.
Chapter I
The Intentions of the Organization
May be the first question that should be answered before going any further in this work is
why a very well established organization should seek for new businesses?
First of all, there is no such thing as a "very well established organization". This premise
implies that the organization will stay where it is in the market (or industry) forever, that its
competitors will stay where they are, and that the competing conditions (in terms of market,
technology and regulations) will always be the same. This is, by all means, false. It has been
subject of study for many years now the rise and fall of what used to be big great corporations,
and the sustainable success of others. In all this studies the dynamic elements of the competition
are easily identifiable.
Certainly, there is a lot of organizations that have accomplished so many stages in the
industries and markets in which they compete, that have been always regarded as icons and are
considered role models -and their captains as legends-, either for their long term successes or
their courageous recoveries.
Nevertheless, in almost any case, organizations have had to be reinvented at a certain
point in time in order to assure their future existence for a wide variety of reasons and, once an
organization has decided to reinvent it self, this has been done in a wide variety of means.
Technology has played a key role for reshaping organizations, mostly in the second half
of the XX Century. Disruptive technologies have allowed new start-up companies to enter
emerging markets and create value for both, customers and shareholders. Technology has also
been the driving force of the fall of "very well established organizations" in what used to be
"known competition arenas". However, there have been a significant number of companies that,
despite the appearances of new disruptive technologies have been able to maintain their position
and also to enter new markets.
On the other hand market evolutions and the necessity for growth -driven by market
value- have forced many companies to seek for new ventures in markets that not only were
unknown for them, but hard to conquer with their existing organizational capabilities.
Those organizations that have dared to reinvent their business have done it in
dramatically different ways. These ways have ranged from, diversification and integration -the
strategies of choice for growth in the 1970's and early 1980's-to new product developments
and mergers and acquisitions it the later 80's and the 90's.
All of these strategies had proven to have different probabilities of success, indeed. What
has been the "home run that saved the day" for some companies, has been beginning of the end
for others. The surging of fads and fashions trying to be adopted in standardized processes for
many organizations have ended in dismal and frustration leading to dramatic stories of failure
and loss of value.
Reinventing an organization's business requires the analysis of multiple elements for the
formulation of strategies and actions needed for the organization. A strategy needed for such
reinvention has to be based on the intersection of multiple issues and elements. The analysis of
technological and market trends, an adequate organizational model, and an adequate financial
strategy is not only key, but is the basis for the formulation of an acceptable strategy for
identifying and to develop the initial steps for entering new businesses. The following figure
points out those elements that I believe are the key for formulating strategies and that will be
discussed in the upcoming sections.
Integrated Strategies for New Businesses
Organizational
Criteria for the
New Business
Identification of
General Trends
Evaluation of
Uncertainties
Identification
of Business
Opportunities
*Diversification
-Growth
-Evolution
'Forces of change
-Technological evolution
'Market evolution
'Scenario Creation
'Management of uncertainty
'Financial valuation
'Definition of Business Plans
'Real Options
I Development of New Businesses I
Each organization has its own organizational capabilities; has developed a unique culture
and the individuals that integrate the internal network have developed organizational skills that
underlie in the inherent strengths of the company. No two organizations look alike, and no
strategies have the same outcome. Let us tackle the relevant issues from the organizational point
of view when analyzing firms' evolution.
Growth, Diversification and downscoping
One of the most studied phenomena in strategic management literature is that of
companies entering new businesses -or growing- either, through augmenting the breadth of their
markets, products and geographical areas, integrating into their value chain or diversifying their
businesses to related and unrelated areas. In the following chart Hax and Maljluf (1991) show
those generic strategies followed by companies to grow and diversify.
Generic Strategies for Growth and Diversification
Vertical
DiversificationI
*Volume, Geographical Expansion
*Breadth of Markets Covered
-Breadth of Product Line
*Forward (Getting closer to customers)
*Backward (Getting closer to suppliers)
*Related
*Product R&D
*Process R&D
*Procurement
*Manufacturing
-Marketing
*Distribution
-Retailing
*Unrelated (Conglomeration)
Source: Hax and Majluf, 1991
Growth<
Although, these strategies may be generic not all diversified firms look alike, however
diversification means moving into new lines of business for all companies. This movement into
new business is present in any of the different streams for growth shown in the chart. However,
the necessities for analyzing the implications of the strategy are different for each stream.
After developing a successful product, and also having success in a particular market,
many companies will see logical to follow a horizontal growth; this means to expand the existing
business within its current product and market structure. This expansion can be accomplished by
increasing the market penetration that may lead to a higher level of sales and, perhaps, the
introduction of the products into new geographical markets. In addition, new related products or
new evaluated versions should be introduced in the existing markets. This strategy is usually
called horizontal integration.
The second generic strategy involves an extension of the stages of production and
distribution in which a company operates. The company might consider producing materials or
products that are currently purchased from suppliers from outside of the boundaries of the firm.
Or the company could decide to "integrate" its production operations toward "follow up"
products or services based in the current products of the firm. This strategy is called vertical
integration, and can be forward (follow-up) of backward (preceding) integration depending on
the extension of the operations.
In addition to the latter strategies a company might decide to enter new segments,
broadening its offerings to other markets and products not offered before. This would lead a
company to a diversification strategy that could be into related and/unrelated businesses.
Related business units support or complement one another, typically in marketing,
research, or production. Unrelated business usually has very few elements to share (skills or
resources) with the rest of the organization. This broadening of corporate portfolio would lead to
conglomerate diversification. The reasons for adopting a diversification strategy are diverse, and
include the desire to take advantage of synergies, stabilizing profits, using internal capital
markets and cash maximization in the company.
Certainly, many companies have had great success after a strong diversification strategy
in the past, however many companies have refocused their efforts and, after having years of
diversification had gone into a divesting spiral in order to take advantage of their own core
competencies. This will lead us to discuss the "downscoping" of the companies.
Hoskisson and Hitts (1994) argue that "there is connection between extensive
diversification and a decline in the competitiveness of large firms". Among the causes of this
decline we can found the unwillingness of many managers to bear the risks of long term R&D
efforts to innovate products and processes. It seems that those companies that have diversified
their businesses into related areas, or that have a lower level of diversification, have a higher
expenditure in R&D activities and, somehow, have generated more innovations for the market.
As the firm diversifies the managers face and increasing difficulty to apply strategic
corporate controls on the different businesses, given the large amounts of information that have
to be processed and the spans of control needed. In less diversified companies a manager have
less information and span of control, therefore is easier for them to understand the nature of the
business and the dynamics of the environment.
Once the company has reached high levels of diversification strategic controls are
substituted by financial controls. Managers are evaluated on the basis of financial outcomes
rather their strategic intends. This eases the amount of information that the corporation has to
process for corporate executives. In the end what may happen is that executives are less able to
ascertain weather poor financial outcomes are the result of ineffective strategy formulation and
implementation or of events out of the control of the division manager.
Furthermore, this financial control emphasizes the short-term results over the long-term
results. Managers whose performance is measured only by financial controls turn into risk-averse
managers and try to accomplish short-term financial goals, rather than long term commitments
with innovation in the company. This is particularly true in the acquisitions strategy for
diversification.
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Many companies have felt the necessity to refocus their activities and to downscope their
businesses. Downscoping means restructuring the company in order to reduce diversification.
This will allow the firm to reinstall strategic controls and hold a portfolio of businesses that takes
advantage of their own core competencies. This does not mean that diversification is necessarily
negative for the firm, but the level of the diversification (and new businesses) has to be
correlated to the core competencies of the firm.
Companies like General Electric are examples of downscoping. Between 1981 and 1992,
GE divested $9 Billion assets of unrelated businesses and "squeezing" 350 product lines in 13
divisions (Hoskisson and Hitts, 1994). This strategy did not kept GE from growing; GE acquired
in the same period $12 Billion in assets of related businesses.
The point that I try to make is that companies can still grow and enter new businesses
without losing their strategic focus. Also, diversification should have a rationale that resembles
the companies core competencies and with a full understanding of the environment in which they
operate. Although the strategic approach for developing new businesses is key, it is also
important to define how organizations evaluate the decision to enter a new business and the
implications of the most common methods.
Economic Valuation of New businesses at a Glance
In the end, the motivation for developing new businesses in any organization -or for an
individual- is to increase growth. This means to add economic value to the organization. It is true
that I have mentioned in the latter section the need of managers to have strategic controls, and
that emphasizing financial control produces risk adverse mangers. However, it is also true that
any business that do not add economic value for itself -even non-profit organizations- will
eventually "cannibalize" the rest of the economic income of an organization -or personal
income, at the individual level.
Given this situation, it is important to understand those adequate tools for evaluating new
businesses, in order to assure creation of value for the stakeholders of the business. Notice that I
do no use "shareholders", I strongly believe that there is more than share value maximization in
managing businesses, a manager should create value for her employees as well as for her
employers. One the goal is to develop, along with core competencies, technology, and
understanding the competitive environment, a sustainable competitive strategy for the business.
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (1994) have suggested that the best measure for evaluating
the performance of a particular organization be through measuring value creation. Value is
defined as discounted cash flows. This measure requires complete information, this means to
manage the cash flows on both the income statement and the balance sheet, and to be able to
compare cash flows from different time periods on a risk-adjusted basis.
One of the advantages obtained by measuring value is that value cannot be short-term
oriented; however other measures can be. For example, earnings per share (EPS) or return on
equity (ROI) are usually used in a short-term orientation, requiring information about the next
few years in the best cases. Other measurers such as the spread between return on invested
capital (ROIC) and the cost of capital can also be used in a short-term manner, encouraging
underivestment (harvesting the business to increase ROIC) (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1994).
This reflects a risk adverse manager.
Using value for measuring the performance of a business -new or existing- requires a
long-term perspective. It requires a focus on long-run cash flow return. It also requires "a
willingness to adopt a dispassionate, value-oriented view of the corporate activities that
recognizes businesses for what they are -investments in productive capacity that either earn a
return above their opportunity cost of capital or do not" (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 1994).
The manger committed to value creation should take an "outsider's view" that allows her
to take opportunities that create value for the firm. This is particularly important for the
development of new businesses, where there is a risk of diversifying the firm towards areas
where creating value is difficult for the organization.
When using internal capital market -or any other source, in fact- for developing new
businesses, using discounted cash flows (DCF) -or net present value- gives information about
the business in the light of other opportunities for investment. The rate of discount used is the
cost of opportunity for the firm for investing in other instruments i.e. bonds, stock portfolio, real
estate. Thus if a new business yields higher "real present value" than the cost of opportunity (or
cost of capital), the possibility of creating value for the firm through the development of that new
business is also higher.
There is a clear difficulty in using DCF; this is, actually identifying the cash flows.
However an intelligent manager will use different scenarios with different levels of cash flow. If
the present value of those scenarios are negative or near zero, one should reevaluate that
investment, due to a low value creation in the future. The adoption of this value creation oriented
management, is called Value-Based Management (VBM); elaborating on this concept is not the
objective of this research, although is an important area to be studied.
DFC emerged as the practice or choice during the 1970's (Luerhman, 1997). In those
years the calculation of cost of capital was represented a real difficulty and a tedious work. To
solve the problem, the DFC version that emerged as best practice was to discount the cash flows
at a weighted-average-cost-of-capital (WACC). WACC based DFC, allowed companies to apply
a specific discount rate based on its own performance. This practice has been around since then.
WACC helped managers to make faster calculations, however the advancements in
computing has allowed to make more sophisticated calculations -that certainly improves the
performance of WACC- but really eliminates the necessity of having a one-size-fits-all approach,
such as WACC. Computing really enables the possibility of calculating discount rates for each
type of project rather than using a "company" discount rate. Unfortunately, many managers still
use WACC nowadays -when risk and uncertainty are higher than ever- to evaluate new
businesses as well as strategic investments of the companies.
Given the facts described in the latter paragraphs, a new approach was developed for
DFC, dubbed, "adjusted present value" (APV). APV is "the basic approach of DFC relationship
to each of a business's various kinds of cash flow and then add up the present values". APV was
suggested by Stewart Myers of MIT, and is based in the analysis of two categories of cash flow,
the first, "real" cash flows (such as revenues, cash operating costs, and capital expenditures) -
real business.
The second are "side effects" that are associated with its financing program (such as
values of interest tax shields, subsidized financing, issue costs, and hedges). This method relies
on the principle of value additivity, this means to split a project into pieces, value each piece, and
then to add them back up (Luehrman, 1997).
The main advantage that APV offers is that before -even after- a manager evaluates a
new project (new business or strategic investment) is able to split the effects of many factors. For
example, if an acquisition is being considered, APV will help how much value will be created by
cost reductions, operating synergies, regional risk, and new growth or tax savings.
On the flip side of APV is that in numerous occasions calculating a discount rate for the
projected cash flows is extremely difficult for numerous reasons. The wide variety of capital
structures of a particular project or new venture increases the difficulty of calculating an
adequate discount rate. On the other hand, the accuracy of the valuation is based on the accuracy
of the projected cash flows, as I already stated, which are often based on assumptions on the
economy, economy of an industry or market evolutions.
An alternative to DFC based analysis is the use of Option Pricing Theory (OPT) applied
to every day decisions. This approach is known as Real Options. Stewart Myers coined the term
"real option" at the Sloan School of Management at the MIT and is an extension of the OPT
applied to non-financial assets. It is not the objective of this thesis to discuss the details of the
real options approach, but to point some cases where is prudent to use it.
Basically an option is the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future.
Options are valuable when there is uncertainty. For example, one option contract gives to the
holder the right to buy (call option) or sell (put option) a stock in the financial market to a pre-set
price (exercise price) in some point in the future.
The real option approach uses the principles of the OPT writing options on assets such as
land, natural resources, equipment, production i.e. non-financial assets and calculating its value.
The inputs needed for the real option calculation are: the current value of the asset, the changes
in value of the asset in a specified time frame, the volatility of the asset value (i.e probability of
value change-usually historical based on the market) a private risk level (similar to the latter but
inherent to the firm) and a risk free rate of return based on short term financial instruments
(Treasury Bonds, for example).
The underlying premise in the real option approach is that a higher level of uncertainty
increases the value of an option. Uncertainty widens the range of outcomes in the future and that
a greater uncertainty has only the effect of increasing upside potential (Amram and Kulatilaka,
1999).
Amram and Kulatilaka suggest that the real option approach should be used under the
following situations:
* In contingent investment decisions.
* When uncertainty is large enough to wait for more information and not to be locked
in to irreversible investments.
4e The value of a project is based on growth options rather than current cash flows
* When uncertainty allows flexibility in the future investments
* When there are updates and mid-course strategy corrections
Approaches, such as option pricing, have been applied to evaluate future opportunities,
however there is a strong opposition of many scholars to apply these sophisticated tools to
projects where there are no assets underlying the option analysis, this would be the case of R&D
projects. Luerhman suggests that this tools still remain in the domain of specialists and the
generalists (managers, for instance) would gain some insights from these analysis, but the gains
are not proportional to the great efforts needed to understand and apply this tools correctly.
Furthermore, real projects have many more factors to be analyzed and that reducing them to a
"put" or "call" analysis is way too risky.
Financial tools are all important, however they are not replacement for each other, but
supplements. Simple DFC, WACC based DFC and APV, have the same principles, what is
important is to understand why those methods were developed and to understand which are their
strengths and weaknesses. Also, option valuation is a supplement for gaining insights about an
uncertain project. Basing a strategic investment analysis on only one of the methods could be
misleading.
In the next section I will approach the issue of understanding "the big picture" in order to
help to develop successful strategy for entering new businesses.
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chapter 2
Change, Uncertainty and the Future
Understanding the Forces of Change
In the task of identifying new businesses for an organization and dealing with uncertainty
it is key to understand the driving forces that are shaping the future. It is important to mention
that I am not suggesting that the future can be predicted, but that the elements behind changes are
understood and the meaning for a particular organization are identified.
This section could be dedicated to list all those elements and changes that have been
studied in the last 15 years by a long list of futurists and scholars, such as John Naisbitt, Herman
Kahn and Alvin Toffler, among others. However, I believe that it is more important to
understand a way in which those elements can be put together and be used for decision making at
the corporate level.
Risk and Uncertainty
Uncertainty arises from the ambiguous and complex causal situations underlying the
internal operations and external environment of an organization. It also defined as an inability to
assign probabilities to the likelihood of future events (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Risk refers
to the potential loss if the outcome is bad, which in the evaluation of differing strategies is a
primary management concern.
Risk and uncertainty need not be fully correlated. Rather, the risk for a strategy is a
combination of the inherent environmental uncertainty and the asset exposure a firm opts for in
its pattern of decision. While uncertainty can never be completely controlled or eliminated,
mu - _____________________
choices about the pattern and timing of resource commitments, which are clearly subject to
managerial discretion, can therefore be made to achieve a desired level of risk.
Generic Approaches to Deal with Uncertainty
In general, dealing with uncertainty means taking actions, making decisions and/or
allocating resources given certain facts or events either in the environment or the firm itself.
Collis (1992) has proposed that the dimensions of timing and breadth define the generic
approaches to uncertainty. In the following matrix the two dimensions define the four generic
approaches proposed by Collis.
Generic Approaches to Uncertainty
Timing
Earlier Later
76)
Dedicated Opportunistic
Insurance Incremental
Source: Adapted from "The Strategic Management of Uncertainty", Collis, 1992
Certainly no strategic decision requires the instantaneous allocation of all the resources
that will be involved over the life of a strategy, and it is unusual to establish a strategy that does
not require any allocation of resources at the beginning. In that sense the timing axis is intended
to capture variability in the timing of a particular decision making, regarding investment,
resources or managerial commitment. It differentiates between those strategies that are "de
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facto", and therefore more vulnerable to unpredictable outcomes later, and those where decisions
are deferred until later when any uncertainty is likely to have been resolved.
The breadth axis differentiates the strategies according to the range of future options that
are kept open. It covers both the number of alternatives that are pursued simultaneously, and the
extent of options opened up by deciding for a particular single course of action.
In general, delaying a decision, lets say an investment, increases flexibility. When an
investment is deferred, choice is retained. Alternatives remain open and decisions can be made
contingent on the resolution of uncertain events. Unfortunately, delays come at the cost of the
lost opportunity to a first mover advantage and build a competitive advantage. The options
available today gradually expire as competitors move first, so that when (and if) the investment
is made, the returns are reduced by competition. Delay is therefore a less risky strategy, but it is
potentially less profitable.
In a similar way, although investing on a wide range of alternatives increases the security
of a strategy, it comes either at the cost of the additional investment programs incurred, or at the
cost of the inherent flexibility of the investment. Following I describe the four generic
approaches to uncertainty.
Insurance
The Insurance approach reduces risk by committing at time "zero" (the moment of the
making a decision) to multiple strategic alternatives that guarantee a return to the company under
all foreseeable future outcomes. Even if some of the alternatives become redundant as
uncertainty is resolved, they are worthwhile because of their value were the uncertainty to
resolve itself another way. Once the outcomes of the future are known a manager might wish she
had not made all the investments. A priori a manager chooses to ensure a favorable outcome.
The inherent problem with the Insurance approach is the risk of being 'caught in the
middle'. A firm wants to pursue a low-cost strategy, for example, but invests in a flexible project
to protect itself in case the market demand for one product does not materialize. In so doing, it
ends up as a higher-cost administrative system (let us say manufacturing facilities) than a
competitor which only invested in a specialized project. Insurance can be just too expensive.
Dedicated
The Dedicated approach, in contrast, essentially bets it all' on one uncertain outcome. It
requires focused decisions that commits today to one specific strategy and is predicated on a
belief that the uncertainty will resolve itself a particular way. Everything is focused around
positioning the firm for that hoped-for future state of the world, and no safety net investments are
made to ensure against unfavorable outcomes. This maximizes the payoff if the uncertainty
resolves itself the way the strategy assumed, but it provides no security if the outcome is any
different.
The main risk of the Dedicated approach is the divergence of the outcome from that
expected. Furthermore is the risk that competitors duplicate the dedicated decision. It is common
that in capital-intensive industries, a number of firms attempt to preempt rivals by making a
focused capacity expansion, only to find that no one pre-empted anyone else and that excess
capacity has been installed which destroys industry profitability.
Incremental
The Incremental approach delays decisions until it is absolutely necessary to support the
strategy or until key uncertainties have been resolved favorably. Although the full strategy is
often defined in advance, its completion is only revealed as time passes by. The critical element
in this approach is a strategic road map that describes the timing and the sequence of three
parameters that determine the development of the strategy.
The essence of the Incremental approach is therefore that it is sequential and gradually
escalates in response to the appearance of information. Therefore, pursuing contingent contracts
and phased investment projects are examples of this approach.
Opportunistic
The fourth approach, Opportunistic emulates an 'entrepreneurial' approach where strategy
is not predetermined but adopted and altered, as uncertainties are resolved and opportunities
open and close. It employs a strategy of organizational flexibility and responsiveness rather than
up front decision making.
The Opportunistic approach aims to capitalize on unanticipated opportunities that may
develop, investments for example should therefore be minimized, and contracts avoided or kept
as short-term. In this approach the fight for resources is fierce among organizational units. It is
this breadth of investment which distinguishes the Opportunistic from the Incremental approach.
The Opportunistic approach is merely one generic approach to managing uncertainty. It is
not applicable in every situation. When is each generic approach appropriate? No hard and fast
rules can be given. The answer is case specific, however Collis states that the approach will be
dictated by three factors which should be well understood: the nature of uncertainty, the
economics of the industry and the state of competition. These elements are somehow embedded
in the methodological approach that I will present in the following chapters.
Not Forecasting but Plotting the Future
I will argue that a clear understanding of the possible outcomes of the future will lead to a
better way to identify those businesses that have a better promise of success and will also help to
respond quickly with changes in the organization, as well as a better decision making. In fact, as
Davis and Davidson (1991) point out, "the best place to look for the basis of organizational
change is in the future business, and the worst place to look is in the current organization".
One way to accomplish the task of understanding the forces of change is by creating
future scenarios. Scenario creation is not a forecasting technique. It pretends to tell stories about
the future by identifying the driving forces behind the change, presenting different alternative
images about the future. Scenarios "are vehicles for helping people to learn" (Schwartz, 1991).
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Often managers prefer to rely in the "certainty" of the forecaster work. However, very
often forecasters fail in their task. The creation of scenarios will allow managers to be prepared
for whatever happens. "It is this ability to act with a knowledgeable sense of risk and reward that
separates both the business executive and the wise individual from a bureaucrat or a gambler"
(Schwartz, 1991).
Scenario creation begins with the identification of the critical uncertainties for the
business. In the case of evaluating a new business it is necessary to identify the uncertainties
related with the possible success or failure. Once these uncertainties are identified, the next phase
is to select the two most critical ones. This selection will lead to define four different scenarios.
Using the two critical uncertainties, the next task is to create a chart in which the uncertainties
take different (and contrary paths).
Once the different scenarios have been characterized, the decision-maker should analyze
the new business in the light of the possible outcomes. One should identify which are the
characteristics that a product or service should have; which are the elements for a supporting
organization; the profile of the employees and executives; which are the markets that the
business should serve now and in the future, etc.
The factors identified in this exercise are basically the strategic elements of control that a
manager should monitor. This, regarding chapter 1, is only possible when the organization has an
adequate level of diversification and financial controls are important but not absolute. The main
difficulty in this exercise is the identification and selection of the key uncertainties for the new
business, Schwartz (1991) suggests a list of four areas where to look at for "driving forces" of
change, which could be uncertainties for a particular decision to make.
l Science and Technology. This force is an important driver for change; once an
innovation is released into the world, it cannot be taken back. I will approach the
technology evolution later in this report.
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" Perception-Shaping Events. Public perception changes in time. It reveals the
beliefs system of the society and can pivot the direction of history.
" Music. "If television suggests what people are perceiving, music shows what
people are feeling". Popular music affects kids not only a local level, but also at a
global level. There is a commonality in the global music preferences and it carries
a particular message for every individual in the world.
* Fringes. These are ideas that are not totally rejected but only accepted by a few.
The difficulty of the acceptance of these ideas is a matter of diffusion, but once
they make it to the mainstream population, the inertia that they gain is enormous.
Normally they carry a high level of creativity
Among other things, Schwartz argues that the sources of where to see these driving
forces are multiple, but widely available to the public. He suggests that remarkable people such
as artists, scientists and "right side" thinkers are a great source of information. Also what he calls
filters i.e. magazine editors and commentators that have access to information and "filter" it to
the mainstream public.
I believe that theses particular sources are important but have a high level of risk of
biasing the information depending on their interests, and that is more important to find personal
trustful sources for valid information. On the other hand, it is also suggested that challenging
environments and networking are valuable sources for getting information as well as for
validating whatever we have gathered by ourselves.
Other element that should be evaluated in understanding the forces of change to be
included in a scenario analysis, is the competitive profile of the region in which an organization
operates. The sources for competitive advantage of a region are multiple, and typically involve
local natural factor conditions, demand conditions, related industries and rivalry among
competitors (Porter, 1990).
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Intuitively, one can think that a new business that is related to those industries, in which a
region has competitive advantage, has more probability of success. This might be true, however,
it is also important to understand that a region can lose its competitive advantage for a number of
reasons and that the factors in the "diamond" described by Porter in his book "The Competitive
Advantage of Nations" can change in time.
Utterback and Afuah (1996) suggest that a region can lose its competitive advantage as a
result of the emergence of a dominant design or the arrival of a technological discontinuity.
Before the arrival of a dominant design in an industry there is an emphasis on product
innovation. Once a dominant design has arrived, the emphasis of the companies is to innovate
the process to deliver products under the dominant design. If there is difficulty in the region to
start new businesses (firms) the incumbent firms will tend to dominate and the expected outcome
would be less product innovation, thus the region will lose its competitive advantage due to lack
of innovation.
On the other hand a technological discontinuity -the replacement of one technology for
another- may obsolete the capabilities of manufacturers, suppliers, customers and related
industries due to the inability to adopt a new technological wave or a disruption in the
relationship among the players of an industry. This would create a high level of uncertainty for
all the stakeholders.
This phenomenon should not only be of interest of businessmen, but policy makers and
government officers. If a region is capable to recognize this changes in the competitive
conditions, should also be capable to develop incentives for starting up new innovative
businesses and make "social" investments to establish mechanisms for promoting innovation and
creativity within its key economic sectors.
In the latter paragraphs has been described one of the elements which I believe is key for
scenario creation oriented to new business identification, that is the evolution of technology. I
will dedicate the next section to highlight what I believe are the most relevant elements for
evaluating technology evolution and its implications when dealing with uncertainty.
I.
Uncertainty due to the Evolution of Critical Technology
In this section I will address the issues about the evolution of the technology that is
critical for the business, the critical technology. Every business within a company has a critical
technology associated. Although in some cases the technology underlying the operation of a
business is "state of the art", in others can be trivial, however in every case a full understanding
of its performance and evolution is key. In any case changes and evolution in the technology can
create significant uncertainties for the business opening up opportunities or threatening the
competitive position of the firm.
The role of the technology can also vary from business to business. Some businesses are
built on a certain technology that enables a particular product or a specific process that represents
the business' competitive advantage. Furthermore, in other cases, the technology is the product.
This critical technologies in every business as different paths and speed in their
evolutions. In the past ten years many authors have studied and written about the future of
certain technologies and the linkages among them, as well as the benefits for the general public.
More important than trying to forecast what will happen with particular technologies,
managers should understand the way that technologies affect their businesses and the way that
they do business. While it is true that technology by itself open opportunities, it is also true that
those who understand its impact in business are the ones that take advantage of its benefits.
The first step of understanding the evolution of technology the uncertainties that creates
and the opportunities that opens, it is key to have a full knowledge of the critical technology for a
business. Far from the technical understanding of a product or a process a manager should know
-at minimum- those key parameters for evaluating the performance of a particular technology.
Foster (1986) has proponed the S-Curves for forecasting and evaluating the performance of
technologies. This is an easy-to-use tool for managers to understand the critical technology of
their business.
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"The S-curve traces out the path of development of new products and processes with each
successive point on the curve representing an improvement in performance" (Foster, 1986). He
argues that the pattern of the S-curve repeats in every industry and, in an empirical manner, he
suggests that the behavior that these curves describe will continue to do so in the future.
Figure 3: S-Shaped Curve
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An S shaped curve describes the increase in performance (Y-axis) as a function of effort
(X-axis). The performance is measured in what is considered the key parameter of performance
of the technology. It is important to mention that the parameters of performance can be multiple,
this suggests that more than one S-curve is needed to describe the evolution of a particular
technology.
The effort represents the amount of resources spend -or invested- in the improvement of
performance of a product or technology. This effort can be measured in accumulative time
dedicated to R&D activities, capital invested in innovation, etc. The behavior of the
performance described by the S-curve can be interpreted as follows: In the early stages of a
technology the efforts that are dedicated to its improvement are high, and the yields are relatively
low.
This represents, in some cases, the stages in which breakthroughs are obtained. This stage
is characterized by the emergence of dominant designs. A dominant design of a product is an
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accepted "architecture" by the market and producers that is built on a set of established
standards.
Once the technology has gained momentum the resources needed to yield higher results
are less than in the beginning and the improvements obtained are result of incremental
innovations over the technology. This stage is characterized by decreasing innovation in product
and a increasing emphasis in the process improvement.
The top of the curve comes once the technology has reached, either a physical limit or the
design behind the technology is exhausted, therefore the yields in performance improvement are
low and the efforts are high again, resembling the initial stages of the technology. Once a
technology has reached this stage is considered to be mature.
Almost in every case the S-curves representing the technology of a business come in
pairs. This represents a new development in the same market that allows better results compared
with that of the existing technology, and the second technology replaces the first one. A classic
example of this phenomenon is the replacement of vacuum tubes by solid-state electronics.
Figure 4: Technology replacement
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Source: Foster, Richard, "Innovation, The Attacker's Advantage", 1986
UThis technology displacement represents discontinuities. This gap between two S-curves
is very difficult to identify and sometimes these periods are regarded as chaotic in an industry
and within the organizations.
Solving the uncertainty created by this gap is one of the most difficult tasks for the
managers; the capital needed to invest in new generations of technologies are difficult to show;
the skills of the organization may not be the needed to use and be efficient; and the outcomes of
the investments are uncertain. If well managed this change of S-curves can be a great success for
a firm. If not, it could represent its doom.
One of the fundamental dilemmas is that protecting old technologies appears to be more
economic. Again, if a manager has high pressure on financial controls, therefore her risk profile
can be low.
This means that, in order to meet financial and short-term goals the risk averse manager
could prefer to stick with the more economic action, and lose the opportunity to step ahead of the
competition by developing skills in a new technological generation.
One of the most important setbacks of S-curves, the way that Foster present them in his
book, is that these are constructed in historical data. This means using historical data to describe
the technology performance over time. The main problem found in this approach is that
identifying the pattern of behavior of a developing technology can be very difficult.
One can easily argue that technologies can have an unexpected breakthrough during its
incremental innovation phase, therefore the "life cycle" of the technology could be extended to a
point where there is a real unknown limit, as showed in the following figure.
Figure 5: Technological Breakthrough during the Incremental Phase
Breakthrough ,
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The way that I believe this issue can be raised is first, to really know which are the key
parameters to evaluate in a particular technology, and to be acquainted with the developments
(research labs, universities, "fringe" companies and start-ups) that could improve the technology.
Second, once this information is mastered, to create scenarios with the possible outcomes of
these developments, using frameworks such as those proposed by Schwartz (1991).
Since the intention of these first three chapters is to create a theoretical framework, I
would like to leave concrete examples of this proposition for later discussion. Although, there are
many historical examples in previous work (Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1996, Christensen, 1997)
that could be presented to demonstrate the S-Curve approach, I feel more appropriate to put aside
them for a while, and identify new ones and address them in Chapters 4.
Chapter 3
Towards a Structured Methodological Framework for
Managing Uncertainty in New Business Development
In general, a methodology consists of a set of prescribed components or techniques,
singly or in sequence, each of which is dedicated to attain specific products, both tangible and
intangible related to problem solving and design (Warfield, 1990). Traditionally the design of
methodologies has thought to lie in specific applications, such as engineering, software
development, etc. However, these methodologies use so specific language, concepts and context
that are unintelligible for those who are not related with a particular field. In the task of
designing methodologies with a managerial orientation the approach to follow should be such
one that allows integrating different disciplines and be comprehensive for all those involved
parties.
The need for methodologies for achieving tasks at the managerial level has as objective to
give a framework to have a structured way to put together different kinds of elements and having
a logic direction for decision making. This last assessment is probably, what I believe, the most
important for a manager that faces uncertain issues.
I will discuss in this section the elements that a methodology should take in account when
dealing with uncertain managerial situations. The elements that I believe are relevant is the
decision making process, the types of decisions, the complexity of the situations, and creativity.
The Decision Making Process
Management is about making decisions, deciding among a series of alternatives and
using the available information for establishing what is best for the organization. Simon (1994)
proposes that managing and decision making are almost synonymous, and that decision-making
should be studied and "interpreted broadly" to understand the role of the manager that often acts
as a coordinator or facilitator among her peers.
Certainly, the process of decision making is not made by just one person -or a manager-
and is not circumscribed to just one set of data. It implies the integration of facts, opinions and
policies surrounding an issue; implies the coordination of more than one stakeholder in a
particular situation and implies the communication of a comprehensive way to deal with multiple
issues.
Having said that, I will argue that a methodology for dealing with uncertainty should
involve not only the concept of decision making but should follow the process of executive
decision making in order to take in account all the elements that impact a particular situation.
According to Simon, the decision making process typically comprises four stages: finding
occasions for making a decision, finding possible courses of action, choosing among courses of
action, and evaluating past choices. Each of these stages involves different tasks from managerial
staff and use specific sets of data and information for designing alternatives and choosing among
them. At a more generic level these stages can be divided into four activities:
* Intelligence, searching the environment for conditions calling for decision;
** Design, that implies inventing, developing and analyzing possible courses of action;
* Choice, which is selecting a particular course of action from those available;
* Review, which is the phase in which the decision maker assesses the past choices
These elements, along with the ones to follow, should be the spine of a methodology to
deal with uncertainty. The decision making process is very close related to the type of decision
that a manager faces. Following I discuss two relevant types of decisions.
Types of Decisions
Decision-making processes are very much driven by the type of decision that the
manager should made. In this regard, Simon has divided the types of decision making into two
broad categories: Programmed and non-programmed decisions. This discussion is relevant in
managing uncertainty given the nature of decisions that uncertainty involves. It is true that
decisions do not fall always in one or another category, however there is a wide variety of
decisions that fall in between. In the following paragraphs I will describe these categories and the
relevance for managing uncertainty.
Decisions will fall into the programmed spectrum to the extent that they are repetitive and
routine, and that a definite procedure has been established to deal with them. Therefore, these
type of decisions are not treated as novel each time they occur, instead, managers are aware of
them and have a clear course to take. The sources of these decisions are various, and typically
are related to recurrent problems and issues, such as pricing, determination of salaries, etc.
As opposed to programmed decisions, non-programmed decisions are usually novel,
unstructured and there is no clear way to deal with them. These type of decisions arise when
complex and elusive situations appear or because its importance require a "tailored method" to
deal with them. One example of these kind of decisions is the development of a new business
along a product line of the firm but in a different region or country, the diversification of the
portfolio of products of the firm and of course the appearance of a new disruptive technology.
No wonder this type of decision increases the level of uncertainty for the firm and require a
broader framework for corporate strategy. Other authors, such as Bronner (1993) had called
non-programmable decisions as "pure" management decisions.
Now, the fact that those non-programmed decisions are fuzzier to deal with does not
imply that the methods and approaches should be as fuzzy as the situations. I would say that in
this kind of situations, managers should have a more structured framework and a set of steps to
deal with novel situations.
Every day managers face a blend of programmed and non-programmed decisions and
certainly they also face uncertainty in many of them. As I have already stated in Chapter 1,
managers should take advantage of uncertainty, given that uncertainty creates opportunities,
however this should be done in a structured manner. The need for a structure in decision making
under uncertainty is yet increased by another element already mentioned: complexity.
Complexity
Decisions and situations are more complex, the more functional areas and stakeholders
are objectively affected by the issue at stake and/or involved in a decision-making process
(Bronner, 1993). This fact is the result of the necessity to face frequently conflictive arguments
and of the requirement to coordinate content matter and procedure of the problem-solving
process.
Warfield (1990) states that while the concept of complexity is fairly understood and for
having a written definition of it would be enough to read it in a dictionary, the most important
issue is to understand its meaning. The meaning of complexity is derived of the relation of the
individual and the context in which a situation arises. Under this premise the individual would
experience a complexity related directly to her role, this is called situational complexity. For
example a particular situation is perceived in a different way if the individual if she is part of the
situation or is only and observer, this would arise her own biases towards the situation and
therefore to the possible solutions and decisions.
On the other hand, complexity has other dimension that involves the information and
knowledge available to approach a situation, this can be defined as cognitive complexity. Under
this dimension, the individual is affected by the lack (or overload) of information available about
a particular issue or by her own ignorance (or knowledge) regardless her role. Furthermore there
is a lack of knowledge of content matter to solve the given or presumed problem and there is a
lack of experience in the procedural handling for approaching the situation.
Complexity also has a direct relation with the novelty of the occurrences. Problems
requiring decision are perceived as complex if they constitute first-time confrontations with a
specific issue. Complexity results from the novelty or even first-time character of the occurrence
of a problem. Totally contrary to programmed decisions, proven patterns of action are missing.
In such cases the risk of wrong decisions is estimated to be relatively high.
Finally, the complexity of decisions depends on the volume of the respective problem.
This is the result of the number of alternatives, the quantity and diversity of criteria of evaluation
as well as of the quantity of information to be processed mentally. In this case, complexity
results from the physical and psychic workload of the decision-makers.
It can be said that complexity is a central characteristic of management decisions and is a
real phenomenon of decision-making practice. Complexity and uncertainty are usually the main
characteristic of non-programmable decisions and dealing with them will always demand a high
level of creativity, even sometimes absurdity. Following I will discuss the last element of a
methodological approach for dealing with uncertainty: creativity.
Creativity
Creativity is the ability of an individual -or a group- to create new relevant ideas and
perspectives (Mauzy, 1999). The creativity system in any organization must start with strategy.
Creativity is not only about new products and services; it is about new strategic processes and
new perceptions of opportunity. It is one thing to think that creativity is fundamentally and
strategically important for a business. It is another to have a system in place for managing
creativity, a system that people understand, that works effectively, and that regularly leads to the
realization of significant value for the company (Kao, 1997).
Pierre Wack, the head of group planning at Royal Dutch Shell during the 1970s,
introduced the notion of strategy as "the gentle art of re-perceiving". As such, strategy is also an
inherently creative process -which by the way led Royal Dutch Shell to dodge the 70's oil crisis
minimizing its impact on the company (Schwartz, 1991). Creativity should be thought about in
much broader terms, encompassing both innovation and entrepreneurship i.e. taking advantage of
uncertainty for identifying new opportunities. Creativity is how value is realized from those great
new ideas and the processes by which those ideas are developed.
In determining how creativity occurs in organizations, a useful metaphor can be found in
the world of music. There are two basic ways of playing music. One way is to go to the music
store and buy sheet music. Sheet music tells you exactly what notes to play, how loud to play
them, how fast to play them, and so on. Any person with a basic level of skill can sit down and
play those notes.
The other way of making music is jamming, a word that comes from jazz. Jamming
demonstrates the importance of improvisation (Kao, 1996). Improvised music has no sheet music
to dictate how it should be performed. In jamming, there is a set of understandings that guide the
execution of the music, and there is no distinction between rehearsal and performance. The great
thing about jazz musicians is that they just take their instruments and play new notes that sound
good.
If the art and discipline of jazz improvisation can be understood, it is possible to learn
how to practice that art in the world of business. Improvisation is probably one of the critical
skills for businesses to learn in the future, and the process of improvisation must underlie how
organizations formulate strategy going forward. It is very important to clarify that I do not mean
by this to change direction continuously, what I mean is once an objective has been determined
the organization should be able to adapt itself (or its strategies) to changes in the environment.
The functionality of "corporate sheet music" is obvious, everyone knows what to do, how
to do it and when to do it. But its limitations are also easily identifiable, the "corporate sheet
music" can become the end rather than the mean; can lead to oversee opportunities (or threats)
just for the sake of the corporate strategy. In a world where competitiveness depends on how
fast, smart, agile and, above all, creative the organization is, the "corporate sheet music" loses
value.
Recently the Wall Street Journal published an article called "A New Model for the Nature
of Business: It's Alive", in the article the author suggests that the new paradigm in. business
models is one that resembles the natural model. A more biological model, with continuos
adaptation, as opposed to a mechanistical model which is static, rigid and mostly centralized.
Following I show what I believe is a structured way to deal with uncertainty, analyzing
not only the impact in the new business development, but using uncertainties and trends to
identify new opportunities for the firm.
A methodological approach to deal with uncertainty
The main objective of the methodological approach that I will present in this section is to
deal with uncertainty identifying those opportunities that emerge from the relevant environment
of a particular industry. The methodology also pretends that a manager be able to make
adaptations given future events in the environment that create uncertainty.
This methodological approach also pretends to evaluate the most relevant uncertainties
that the business opportunity will face and that will deter the success in the market. Finally once
this uncertainties have been evaluated their impact will have to be translated into a strategic
layout in the business plan.
It is important to mention that the objective of the methodological approach presented in
this thesis is to have a structured way to deal with uncertainty in the development of new
businesses, therefore no methodology for developing a business plan will be discuss in this work.
For this matter I will point some relevant elements for a business plan and some bibliographical
references will be mentioned when applying this framework in Chapter 6.
I have divided the methodological approach into two areas: Organizational Requirements
and Analysis Environmental Issues. I will explain in the following sections the implications of
each of them and the way they interact.
The first area mentioned related to the organizational restrictions that a particular
organization may have for development of new business. Notice that I am using the word
organization instead of firm or company given the fact that this methodology is intended in the
first place for organizational environments, however its use may be expanded to other entities
such as venture capitalists or not-for profit organizations.
The following figure is a schematic representation of the methodology in which two
stages are shown, however the first block could be considered stage "zero" where the
organization defines parameters and criteria for developing businesses and that involves the
strategic process of the firm as whole. This stage is where the organization establishes normative
issues regarding the governance of the firm and that should be reflected in developing new
businesses. This "zero" stage is inherent to each company, this will certainly define the
distinctive seal of the firm over any new venture.
A Methodological Approach to Deal with Uncertainty in New Business Development
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Stages I and II are directly related to environment of the firm and the industry it
competes. Both stages are designed with the intention of provoking in managers the need of
having insights from the environmental issues that surrounds their firms, the uncertainties that
exist and the opportunities for developing new businesses. Stage II includes rolling out a new
venture; this is with the intention of insisting in the need of having "radars" continuously
activated to identify the changes in the environment of the business.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, an organization should establish in advance the firm's
strategic direction; this will dictate which are the overall restrictions for developing new
businesses within the organization. It is a requirement that the organization decides what it wants
to be and from then on decide to which types of businesses will grow or will invest in the future.
Certainly, in many instances the type of business will determine which type of
organizational approach should be applied for the business. For example in some cases an
organization will decide to grow the business as a part of the existing organizational structure,
while in others an organization would opt for starting up a new division or even more spinning
off a business from the core organization.
The discussion of the intentions of the organization in Chapter one was intended to show
which are the most common alternatives for an organization to develop a new business and the
implications that some of them have had in the past. This issue is key in the success of a new
venture. The exercise of evaluating the organizational capabilities and strategic direction should
be an iterative process. This means that an organization should establish what it should be and
then define which are the requirements to accomplish those objectives. The next phase of this
methodological approach has as objective to evaluate the environment of the firm and take
advantage of the trends for developing business, as well the impact in the organizational
structure.
Stage I: Environmental Issues
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For the development of this section of the framework the firm should have a full
understanding of the environment surrounding its business practices. This means to develop an
extensive evaluation of the dynamics of the industry in which the firm operates, to define which
are the sources of competition and try to establish the "state of the art" of the key technologies as
well as the trends at a general level.
This analysis will lead to identify the most important trends and the meaning for the
industry. Another way to approach this stage is to identify "fringe" technologies and based on
them to analyze the impacts and implications for the different stakeholders. This is the approach
taken for analyzing the computer industry in Chapter 4 where, based on a technological
disruption, opportunities and uncertainties are identified.
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The result of this stage is the identification of business opportunities combining the
different trends. This exercise will require a great amount of creativity given the nature of the
analysis. This is particularly true in the cases where industry trends have no intuitive overlaps,
and the teams in charge of the analysis will have to ignore issues as feasibility or technical
restrictions.
Once the business opportunities have been analyzed the second part of the phase will
require to select those business opportunities that seem to be more synchronized with the
strategic direction of the organization. Finally, for each of them the team will define the
attributes from the consumer's point of view as shown in the following diagram.
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This section of the framework complies with the sequence of managerial decision making
developed by Simon and discussed at the beginning of this Chapter. In the first part identifying
opportunities for decision making within the industry is basically and Intelligence task. Later
establishing business opportunities is a Design task given the amount of innovation that requires;
and, finally a Choice task is done when deciding which business opportunities are more in tune
with the organization plus a new Design task in establishing attributes.
Finally a business plan for each of the new ventures must be fully developed
2.b Develop a Business Plan for Each
(or one) of the New Product Services
Business
Plan
Product Business
"A" Plan
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Stage I: Evaluation of Uncertainties
In some sense, stage two is the central point of the framework. As Simon states "Review
is the phase in which the decision-maker assesses the past choices". This stage pretends to be a
Review task based on the analysis of the uncertainties found in the environment that will affect
the new venture.
I would suggest that his stage be done after completing the business plan, however, there
is no reason to restrain a team to develop the uncertainty analysis in parallel with the
development of the business plan. Certainly this will demand more resources to be allocated for
the project valuation team, however would result in a reduction of time to completing the plan
and avoiding important issues to take in account in different sections, such as financial
assumptions and strategic structures of the new venture.
Stage II
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In the following diagram I show the requirements to develop this stage of the framework.
3. Identify the two more critical uncertainties
for each new business (Develop this stage
separately for each new business)
Uncertainties 3.a Plot each uncertainty in two axis
Draw the extremes outcomes of each uncertainty
-Create 4 different scenarios combining the two possibilities
of each uncertainty
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As the reader will quickly deduct this section of the framework is drawn directly from the
work of Schwartz (1991) and his approach to dealing with uncertainty using scenario creation.
The value added of my proposal underlies in the analysis of the sources of the uncertainty.
The next step after creating the possible scenarios is to describe them and establish the
impact on the new venture, as shown in the following diagram, as well as to establish which
parts of the business plan will be modify as a result of the analysis of the industry environment.
3bl. Describe each scenario, define a
story (a future world)
Scenario I Scenario II ScenariolII Scenario IV
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implications of
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business plan
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Roll the New Business
Integrated Strategies
My goal in these first chapters was to explore those elements that will determine the
quality of a strategy aimed to develop new businesses within organizations under uncertainty
from a theoretical standpoint. Certainly some of these elements were presented in a isolated
manner making links where appropriate, however, it is clear that in the task of defining strategies
these elements must be integrated and its analysis should be made in parallel in many parts of the
process.
I showed how firms have addressed in the past the issue of growth and how the
diversification strategies have needed fine tuning after some time bringing the necessity of
downscoping the firms. Many of the diversification movements were developed with a financial
spirit underlying the strategy and the lack of analysis of other elements have forced managers to
reevaluate their corporate strategies.
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Furthermore, many investments have been done in the absence of technological
evolution, and even those investments made for innovation within the firm have been made on
economic basis, keeping firms from managing successfully the discontinuities of the emergence
of new S-curves.
Regional competitive analysis is also a key for the development of new businesses. The
competitive advantages of a region and the competitive conditions of industries are not static.
Theses conditions change in time for a number of reasons, in this paper I made emphasis in the
relationship between lack of innovation in a region and the lost of competitive advantage,
however many other factors, such as political and economic conditions, regulations, etc. play
central roles in this analysis.
Finally an adequate strategy for economic evaluation of new businesses and investments
is fundamental. Applying methods that are flexible enough to take in account, risk and
uncertainty, cash flow scenarios and future opportunities must be fully understood by managers.
Identifying businesses is not a task of one or two disciplines, nor is the result of the
"illuminated" mind of an individual; it is an integrative effort that combines many perspectives
and the adequate evaluation of critical factors that are unique for each venture. The methodology
used for this analysis can change, but based on the full understanding of the tools and approaches
upon which a methodology is built. The following three chapters will be dedicated to study a
particular technological disruption that creates uncertainty and the impact in the industry as well
as some applications of the framework already presented.
Chapter 4
Uncertainties and Opportunities due to Technological
Disruptions
In this chapter I will describe and analyze a case in which the development of a
technological disruption creates both, uncertainty and opportunities. I will use some of the
concepts presented and discussed in Chapter 2, such as S shaped curves and scenario creation,
for making parts of the analysis, as well as public information about the computing industry.
Future Scenarios
Michael Dertouzos in his book "What Will Be" describes what, in his view, the future
will be in terms of technology integration, as well as its benefits for the average citizen. One of
the future scenarios that Dertouzos describes in his book is one where the life of a gentleman is
saved while vacationing, along with his wife, in a remote location in Alaska and is suffering a
severe asthma attack. He is saved thanks to the wonders of the technology integration. A health
kiosk installed in the hotel allows his physician, located in Philadelphia, to read the data sent
from the kiosk via the hotel network and to make a quick evaluation of his condition saving
valuable hours.
Stories about the future, as those described by Michael Dertouzos, had been heard many
times in the past and have always been told as part of the science fiction lore. Today, less than a
year before the beginning of the XXI Century, those stories are leaving the world of make
believe and are jumping into the stories of newspapers and news magazines and being told as
real possibilities.
Although the scenario mentioned above is described by Dertouzos based on a single unit
(the "kiosk"), in reality what he describes is a typical situation where different types of devices
have been able to communicate among themselves, and then, transmit specific data over a
telecommunications network.
One of the problems underlying this setting is how the devices have been able to "talk" to
each other efficiently and in a transparent fashion for their users. Sun Microsystems has
announced their solution for technology integration called JINI TM. This technology has many
strategic implications and creates uncertainties for the industry, for the company and the end
users
Spontaneous Networking or the Ultimate Plug-and-Play
Another setting regarding technology integration is described by Kevin Kelly and
Spencer Reiss in the article "One Huge Computer" (Wired, August 1998), where the transparent
communication among devices is a reality:
"In a windowless second-floor room in a deliberately obscure Sun
Microsystems outpost in Sunnyvale, California, half a dozen anonymous chunks of
expensive-looking hardware sit on long folding tables. Some barely rate a first
look: a not particularly recent printer, what look like a pair of flat-screen
monitors, a video camera, a couple of keyboards. Others are clearly prototypes:
overdesigned purple computer-somethings with curved sides and stylized vents.
Any Demo, Silicon Valley, USA.
Turn any of the devices around, however, and only two wires are visible:
electric power and a RJ-45 Ethernet connection. Each box - even the display
screens and the little handheld camera - is a fully independent network citizen,
able to hold its own on the system, unencumbered by specialized cables, software
drivers, or the rest of the usual array of digital life support.
Say you want to use the camera. Plug it in, and poof - a second later, an
icon appears on your display screen. All the configuration chores are done
automatically by one of those purple boxes - a low-end server called a lookup
device - and by a 25K communication program in the camera. What's in the
viewfinder? Bring the camera image up on a monitor - any one you like. Store a
clip? The 10-gig storage device - a slightly smartened-up disk drives - is waiting.
Edit? There's another of those purple boxes, the computing device, with full
workstation power. Pull some video-edit software out of the storage module, and
you're off
That's one possibility. Or maybe you'd rather batch print some letters from
yqur laptop. Done. Or get that old laser printer online. A pocket-sized adapter
does it. Or add another 10 gigs of storage - no need to call a sysadmin, just grab
a drive off the shelf and plug it in."
What it is described in the above paragraphs is one of the demos set of the new protocol
designed by Billy Joy, VP of Research of Sun Microsystems, dubbed JiniTM (pronounced like
"gee-nee", from the Arabic for magician). The demo is what network administrators, technicians
and users have dreamed about every time that a peripheral device is added to any particular
network or work environment: Spontaneous networking; the ultimate plug-and-play technology -
"plug-and-work".
Kelly and Reiss also point out in their article that "not surprisingly, some of the Jini
demo's most interested visitors have been from hardware companies that would dearly love to
find a way for us all to snap a few billion more microprocessors, disk drives, and other smart
devices into our personal networks". These visitors, as we may suspect, are those who will drive
the initial diffusion of the technology.
This technology becomes particularly important, due to the fact that scenarios such as
those described by Michael Dertouzos are becoming a reality from a strong technology based
firm, and not as part of a research lab in some university or from a garage in a remote location in
California. I do not mean by this to undermine the importance of both, the research lab and the
entrepreneur, but once a market-driven company embraces an innovation, the possibilities of
making it available to the consumer are much higher.
On the other hand, the importance of a technology like this one are the implications to the
existing business models in the industry, the partnerships between companies and the
opportunities created from such a new technological wave. And the obliged question is when and
how will this be available for the common citizen (and if it will really be). By now, I will set
aside the question and I will address it later.
Now, I would like to turn the direction of this discussion towards the technology behind
this spontaneous networking setting, described above, and try to analyze, not only its
performance, but the possibilities that it enables in terms of technology integration and the value
that creates for the consumer.
A closer look to JiniTM and Spontaneous Networking
First let us look at the real hero behind the story: JavaTM. In 1995, Sun Microsystems
amazed the -then young- Internet community with a cross-platform object programming
language called Java, that ran programs over a Netscape Navigator browser, adding movement,
and funetionality to websites freeing them from the mind-blowing boredom of the static of the
pure HTML creations. I remember myself being at Seybold Seminars, in San Francisco, one of
the most important events for the graphic design and printing industry, when a jumping penguin,
in a computer running Netscape Navigator, showed to the gathered attendees the beginning of a
new era in computing.
In a simplified manner (very simplified), Java is a programming language that allows the
same code to run on different computers, devices or gadgets - regardless their platforms or
operating systems - and suppresses the necessity to re-compile or "traduce" the code for the
embedded language in the device's microprocessor.
Java programs are able to run on many different kinds of systems thanks to a component
of the platform called the "Java Virtual Machine", a kind of translator that turns general Java
platform instructions into tailored commands that make the devices execute the indicated tasks.
So far, the most visible examples of Java software are on the Internet and on enterprise
networks. These examples are interactive programs called "applets" that work inside Web
browsers on computers and other devices. In other cases Java programs can run directly on
computers (without requiring a browser), or on servers, on large mainframe computers, or other
devices. These programs range from simple animations on a website to information tracking over
a particular process inside the organization.
The most important setback that the developer's community finds in the Java platform is
the time that a Java applet lasts to be invoked and begins to work in the Web browser. The Sun
labs, however, are aggressively addressing this problem, by developing a new faster compiler
that will be released by the end of the year.
Furthermore, Sun announced on November, 2, 1998, the support of the Linux developer
community to port the Java platform. Linux is a UNIX version based on Open Source
Development i.e. thousands of programmers developing a platform. This will enable faster
incremental improvements over the platform.
Let Jini out of the bottle
Networking today is complex, brittle and inflexible. Attaching a PC to the network and
accessing a networked printer is a very complicated task. A slight change in a network can cause
complications that can be impossible to fix. To add a disk drive for storage capacity typically one
must open a chassis, deal with setting algorithms and deal with amounts of setup questions. From
the consumer's perspective, what is needed is a simple way to plug in hardware and software into
a networked environment and then use the available services immediately. Just like plugging in a
telephone.
Jini is a Sun Microsystems project that expands the Java technology and enables
spontaneous networking of a wide variety of hardware and software - anything that can be
connected to a network. It consists of a small amount of Java code in class library form and some
conventions to create a "federation" of Java virtual machines on the network. Jini follows one of
the deepest mantras of Sun: The Network is the Computer -or Network Computing. Network
computing is a distribution of tasks along a network eliminating the need of being locked to any
particular device to do everything; in some way is an attempt to combine the virtues of the old-
fashioned central time-shared computing with the advantages of the flexible personal computing.
This also allows dedicating specific devices to specific tasks. Explaining the components of Jini,
is a better way to explain network computing.
The Components of Jini
Jini moves us closer to network computing; spontaneous networking is a result -and a
condition- of network computing; just plug into the network and use all the resources available.
The Jini technology can be separated into two categories: Infrastructure and Distributed
Programming. In addition, Network Services can be provided to run on top of Jini.
+ Infrastructure
Jini Infrastructure addresses the fundamental issue of how devices and software connect
to and register with the network. The first Infrastructure element is called Discovery and Join.
Discovery and Join solves the problem of how a device or application registers itself with the
network for the first time with no prior knowledge of the network. The second Infrastructure
element is Lookup. Lookup can be thought of as a bulletin board for all services on the network.
Components of Jini
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Source: JiniTM White Paper, Sun Microsystems, 1998
+ Distributed Programming
Jini Distributed Programming adds to Java additional functionality required for building
distributed systems. Specifically, Jini Distributed Programming provides leasing, distributed
transactions, and distributed events. With these elements, objects in a Jini enabled network are
allowed to "borrow" operational time and capabilities from other devices on the network,
negotiating only with those devices involved.
+ Network Services
On top of the Jini Infrastructure and Distributed Programming, Network Services will be
provided to facilitate distributed computing. An example of Network Service is JavaSpaces.
JavaSpaces are virtual "market places".
JavaSpace
iNonice
Computing
Service
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English- Apple
Spanish Laserwriter
Translation Online Now
Source: Wired Magazine, August 1998,"One Huge Computer"
Using a few simple programming methods, including "read", "write", and "take"
JavaSpaces make software objects available to anyone in a network. The objects themselves can
define a job to be done, a problem to be solved, or a service being offered. A JavaSpace can be
as small as 10k and as large as 100MB.
If all this capabilities described above are for real, and if Jini is able to deliver them, we
are just about to witness the beginning of the end of the desktop computing as we know it (I say).
Having briefly explained the elements of this technology, I would like to turn the focus towards
the strategic implications of this protocol for Sun as well as for their competitors.
Can Jini grant my wishes?
Three wishes: I wish not to deal with configuration drivers and configuration wizards; I wish to
have intercommunication across platforms and generations of devices; I wish to configure home
and office appliances remotely. Can Jini grant my wishes? Certainly can. Clearly Jini offers new
features in networking capabilities and also enables a number of new possibilities that
outperform, in many ways, the current standards in the market. However, Jini's success is
function of various factors.
In general, spontaneous networking is a new "S curve" in networking technology that
outperforms -in its Beta testing- the existing technology based on OS and client-server
architecture. Notice that I am using spontaneous networking rather than Jini. Jini is one of the
possibilities to make spontaneous networking to happen -so far, the only "known" protocol.
Other companies such as Microsoft, Lucent Technologies and IBM claim to be working
in alternative solutions (but nobody has even seen an Alpha test, from them). The following
figure depicts the overall performance of spontaneous networking.
Spontaneous Networking: A new S Curve
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Underlying the three wishes made -which may sound hypothetical, but they are not- are
four elements that I believe are key to evaluate the performance of this new technology: Speed
(Bandwidth), Time of Configuration, Size of Code and Number of Platforms Supported. In the
following chart I describe the relevance of each parameter as well as their market implications.
Parameter Relevance Market Implication
Speed Related with efficiency of the code. Any protocol for networking should
Defines the possibility to use any type of be enabled to work in any network.
network (from 2mbps to 100mbps type Although the tendency is towards
networks) High Speed Ethernet (100mbps),
there are still other types (Ethernet
l0mpbs, BNC Coaxial)
Time of Reduces the need for administration and This is the result of the "easy-to-
Configurati maintenance time of the network. use" protocol that will have two
on impacts: 1) Home users will be able
to "administrate" their own networks
with out being tech savvy. 2)
Commercial users will be able to
dedicate time to other activities and
minimize idle time of resources,
saving costs.
Size of Increases the efficiency of resources Once the size of code that enables
Code usage. Eliminates the need of high cost the networking services is reduced,
servers. the need for "high end" servers for
administration also decreases. High-
end servers then, can be dedicated to
computing tasks.
Number of Eliminates the "lock-in" to one particular This simply eliminates the need of
Platforms platform, allowing any device (type and OS based standards for networking
Supported generation) to be part of a network. services.
Having specified the key parameters for evaluating spontaneous networking under Jini,
following I analyze and compare them using S-curves.
Performance Evaluation of JINI: S-Curves
Speed (Type of Network in MBPS) Time of Configuration (Min/Device)
2 MBPS (Runs in any network 0 Min (Ideal State- Consumer
without degradation >0 Min point of view)
100 MBP1
Size of Code (Bytes-code) Number of Platforms Supported
48 K Byte (Core code of Jini) Any (Any 0S in the
market)
*
600 K Byte (Code of Jini In
Look up device)
(Minimum space required in
200 M byte Wintel server by Windows NT One
4.0 Option Pack)
For each parameter I have identified a physical limit based on available information.
These physical limits are proxies extrapolated from other technologies, however are useful for
the analysis.
For Speed, I have based the analysis in the reports that exist about the Beta tests of Jini
that suggests that there has not been problems in bandwidth, but it is unknown if this is going to
be problem. Sun has claimed that Jini-enabled devices would work on 10mbps Ethernet networks
without significant performance degradation. However it is suggested that if users do not want to
see any performance degradation it is better for them to use 100mbps Ethernet networks.
Although, the number of networking architectures based on 100mbps is growing,
networking devices (Switches, hubs and smart-hubs and networking cards) are still supporting
BNC (Coaxial) and 10mbps Ethernet, thus, these architectures are expected to be around for a
while.
Regarding Time of Configuration, devices under Jini would identify themselves to a
network when they are plugged in, "publishing" to other peripherals and to the system itself
details as whether a printer is color or black and white, its resolution and the like. This will free
the user from making changes in the configuration of a particular machine; thus reducing the
time dedicated to non-value-added activities.
Certainly, Jini is reported to yield near "zero" time of configuration, however, devices
will still have to be enabled and a "look up" server have to be set up in the network. This means
that system administrators will still have to dedicate some time to these tasks.
As shown in previous sections, Jini is just Java software code. It can run on any Java
platform, for example a computer, a server, a printer, etc. The Size of code can be analyzed
under to elements: Kernel and Look-up. First, the core (kernel) of Jini is just 48 KB of code and
has less than 15 application programming interfaces, it is reported that programmers at Sun
stopped when there was nothing left to cut out.
Second, Jini source and binary code, which includes a lookup service and other models,
fits on a single 1.44 Mbytes floppy disk; the full Jini software is 600Kbytes (Look-up device -
low-end server). This code is enough to put a network to work, i.e. to create a Java space with
only 20,000 lines of code. Just for amusement, let us look at other platform: Windows NT
workstation requires a minimum of 110MB of Hard Disk (HD); Windows NT Service Option
Pack 4.0 requires minimum of 200 MB HD -may need double; Windows NT has Approx. 16.5
Millions of lines of code. The efficiency of Jini is obvious compared with the most popular
software for networking services.
Finally and probably the most important factor regarding competition, is the Number of
Supported Platforms (or OS) in the network. As explained earlier in the report, Jini is capable to
support any OS and CPU in the market. It is also expected to support other platforms that may
emerge; for example, Sun has already committed the support of Linux, the Open Source UNIX,
even when this OS competes directly with Sun's proprietary UNIX version, Solaris.
Although Jini is still a "child" in the market, it is clear that represents a breakthrough in
networking technology. It has rapidly reached levels of performance that other protocols have
not even reached yet, either, because companies have not been able or, simply, because they
have not wanted to, fearing to threaten their own competitive positions.
Clearly network computing is a disruptive technology for the computer industry. Who
will take advantage of it and who will not is a different question. So far Sun Microsystems
certainly has a first mover advantage. The next issue to be address is the competitive factors that
will drive the success of Jini-like technologies in the market.
Will it be?
As already discussed, Jini can become the technological disruption that allows a real
integration of technology and network computing. However, there are some uncertainties with
which both, users and providers, have to deal with. This uncertainties clearly are relevant not
only for Sun, but for all the players and possible players in the market. The key uncertainties that
I believe have to be analyzed are:
* If original equipment manufacturers (OEM) will take network computing for
real and will embrace protocols like Jini. And if,
* Movements such as network computing and spontaneous networking turn out
to be the standards of computing in the future.
Using these uncertainties, and plotting the possible two extreme outcomes in a double-
axis chart it is possible to obtain four possible scenarios as a result of the combination of both
uncertainties. The possible outcomes that I believe are feasible for this combination are:
Support of OEMs (function of market) Evolution of Computing
la. OEMs find that network computing is
a winner in the market and embrace it
(Consumers acceptance: home
networking; reinvention of the office
networking).
1b. Mainstream consumers ignore
network computing; OEMs do not
embrace it.
2a. Network computing technology
delivers all its promises: It works.
2b. Network computing is not effective;
desktop computing (OS based) stays as the
"way of life"
In the following chart I map the outcomes of the uncertainties mentioned above and the
four scenarios that their combinations create.
Uncertainties and Scenarios of Network Computing
Network computing a
market winner OEMs
brace it.
Scenario 1:
The Dead of
the OS
Network
computing
Technology
works
Scenario 3:
The Guerilla
World
Scenario 2:
Back to the
Lab
Network
1 Computing
technology
ineffective
Scenario 4:
The Reign of
the Behemoth
Network computing ignored
by mainstream customers;
OEMs do not brace it.
Following I will describe the resulting scenarios.
Scenario 1:
Scenario 2:
Scenario 3:
The Death of the OS. This scenario is the result of a wide acceptance of network
computing and, therefore Jini, combined with a great performance of the
technology in the market. This scenario means that customers are no longer
obliged to buy a specific OS, or even more, computers do not have OS, run little
code in the CPU and share computing capabilities, in both homes and working
environments. Sun is one of the great winners, and Microsoft has to reinvent its
business model because having a specific OS is no longer an issue for the
customer or simply the scenario reduces the OS's value. Companies such as
Apple also gains market share using a great product strategy (iMac and PowerPC
G3) taking advantage of the less importance over the OS issue.
Back to the Lab. Under this scenario, the acceptance of distributed computing
capabilities is greatly embraced by the market. OEMs manufacture enabled
devices, but their performance is poor. This obliges vendors to re-launch some
products, Sun to go back to the research lab and innovators and early adopters
accept "bugs", while companies solve the problems and upgrades are available.
The acceptance of the technology by mainstream customers is delayed until
products are robust. Microsoft applies FUD techniques (Fear, uncertainty and
Doubt) and tries to take advantage of the situation. This scenario will not last
much, will move as the companies learn what to do. A transitional scenario that
means hard times for Sun, depending on the speed of the response can defend the
turf or lose it forever.
The Guerilla World. In this world, mainstream customers do not find the
technology useful; they ignore the network-enabled devices and choose stand-
alone appliances. However, the technology performs very well. This competitive
environment resembles the "guerilla" wars i.e. many isolated battles, not high
profile and no clear enemies. This is a "niche" driven market. Some new OEMs
embraces the technology and pushes their products among "Techies" and early
adopters. The role of Sun Microsystems is not clear. Many "start up" companies
try to take advantage of the niches. This is a transitional scenario, as well.
Scenario 4: The Reign of the Behemoth. The complete failure of the technology, as a result
of the combination of poor performance of the technology and lack of diffusion in
the market. In this scenario Microsoft is still the dominant brand and keeps on
pushing its products as standards in the market. If the technology is accepted in
the future, Microsoft will take advantage of it, reinventing its business without
losing market share and using its muscle to give credibility for the technology
using its brand. The great loser in this scenario: Sun Microsystems.
Now, these scenarios are not "de facto". In the following chart I show the paths that the
future could follow given different situations. In the paths it is clear that I am implying that an
alteration to the dominant design of computing is likely, either with new standards or a
modification of the existing. If scenarios 2 or 3 are reached, depending on the response of the
firms involved, they could be transformed into 1 or 4, which are more stable scenarios, or unless
where the competition is more clear.
Scenarios' Aftermath
The innovators and early adopters bear with
the troubles. Sun quickly re-delivers, and
now gets the work done. Microsoft loses.
The Dead of
the OS
Back to the
Lab
Microsoft takes advantage
Niches are the entrance of the false start and eitherTra nsioato minsrea applies FUD techniques orto mamnstream Seai
consumers: a new becomes leader in network
generation of OEM computing, disguises the
emerges. Continuous Transitional PC and uses its own
fight against Microsoft. snrSnshb
Microsoft loses loser
The Guerilla The Reign of
World the Behemoth
Microsoft wins all battles, stays leader
buys start-ups, blocks Sun and either,
destroys network computing or pushes
its own standards
It is clear that the driving forces of the scenarios are performance and diffusion, however
it seems that technology, as I showed in the latter section, is working and delivering results.
However it is not clear what will the diffusion be like; this is where Sun has to do its homework
getting on-board big names and doing a strong marketing of the benefits that the mainstream
customers will get with the new technology. Given the identified scenarios and the evaluation
performance, diffusion seems to be the "Achilles' Heel" of these architecture. In the next
Chapter I will discuss the issue of diffusion and some elements that will be key for the
acceptance of this technology.
Chapter 5
Technology Diffusion and Value Chains
Donald Norman in his book "The Invisible Computer" (1999) claims that the computing
technology as we know it today i.e. PC based computing, should be replaced for another concept.
Among other things Norman states that the level of complexity that computing has reached a
point where it is impractical: "Try to make one device do many things and complexity increases.
Try to make one device suffice for everyone in the whole world and complexity increases even
more. The single general purpose computer is a great compromise, sacrificing simplicity; ease of
use, and stability for the technical goals of having one device do all".
Norman proposes that the solution for the PC based problem is to break through the
difficulty by using devices specialized for the task to be performed (appliances) and that a
combination of computation and communication infrastructures would provide a tool for
communicating, socializing and working creativity. This is where technologies like Jini have an
important role to answer the question of how to coordinate and communicate these devices.
These "devices" are called Information Appliances, and are appliances specializing in
information: knowledge, facts, graphics, images, video, or sound. An information appliance is
designed to perform a specific activity, such as music, photography, or writing. A distinctive
feature of information appliances is the ability to share information among themselves (Norman,
1999).
I consider Norman to be right, a new model in computing has to be developed either with
of without the PC. In the scenarios that I drew in Chapter 4 I make the point that there are
elements existing in the market that are somehow pushing technology to a new model. For this to
happen there is the need of not only of a technological disruption but the adoption of a new
concept.
Somehow Norman's proposition is being backed up by the behavior of the PC market.
The price war that the industry is experimenting has aroused concerns by some analysts that
growth in the $174 billion worldwide PC market may be nearing an end. Dell, Compaq, Packard
Bell and IBM reported lower that expected sales in the first quarter of 1999 (Wall Street Journal,
1999). And out of them IBM and Compaq are investing in other areas such as information
appliances (hand-held personal data assistants -PDAs). (Business Week, 1999)
International Data Corp. reports that we are within sight of the revenue peak in the
consumer-PC market and not many years away from the peak of revenue in the commercial
market. In fact, because of rapid price declines in home-PCs, it is possible that we have already
passed the revenue peak in consumer sales (Wall Street Journal, 1999).
Market Intelligence, a Ziff Davis research agency, found in a January poll of 13,500
technology firms that, new computer purchases by small businesses fell 8% in January compared
with the year-early period. The same poll showed an increase in sales to medium and large
businesses that brought total unit sales up 3%. However, price declines likely will produce lower
overall revenue (Market Intelligence, 1999).
In general PC shipments should grow 15% in 1999 (Business Week, 1999), down from
levels of over 35% of growth during the mid 1990's. It is estimated that this slowdown added to
the falling of prices, would yield and overall growth in revenues of 5% by the end of 1999.
On the other hand, International Data Corporation (IDC) estimates that the access to the
Internet through the PC will come down from 94%, as of today, to 64% in 2002 due to the use of
set top boxes, web phones and palm-size computers. IDC do also estimates that the sales of
information appliances by 2002 will surpass the sales of PCs to consumers.
While 48% of U.S. homes now have a PC, analysts don't expect that to rise above 60%
because information appliances will take on many of the jobs now handled by the PC. That
means PC makers, for the first time, will have serious competition in the use of the Internet.
Adding to that, it is estimated that more people will spend more time online. In today's
PC-based world, Internet users spend up to 40 hours a month online, says Sky Dayton, from the
Internet service provider EarthLink Network Inc. But by giving consumers the devices to log on
to the Web more often and more conveniently doing trivial tasks such as checking the local
movie schedule or even buy a car the online time could rise to 200 hours the monthly time that
consumers spend online.
To reach the mainstream consumers companies have to offer cheaper and easier to use
devices, this will certainly drive a fundamental change in how products are conceptualized and
designed. Instead of designing tech-based products and hoping they find uses, companies will
have to dreaming up services with consumer value and then build devices that can deliver them.
This lead me to discuss the other side of the equation: who is going to manufacture the devices.
Partnering and finding value
OEMs and mainstream consumers -actually their attitudes- will be the key players to
drive the diffusion of a technological disruption like Jini. And as seen in the scenarios its
outcome will characterize the competitive environment for the involved firms.
OEMs have resisted the notion of embedding networking capabilities into their products
because they have not seen a marketing need to do so. However many of them hide behind the
excuse of not knowing which networking protocol will emerge as the standard. With Jini-like
technologies acting as a translator, the debate over the protocol emergence is no longer and issue.
For explaining this issue I will take Jini and Sun's strategy, given the fact that is the only
protocol that is known today in the market. The first factor of the diffusion of Jini, is a function
of a widespread acceptance of Java. A critical step was taken during 1996 with the development
of the Java application-programming interface (API) for microcontrollers that are found in cost-
sensitive products to be programmed using Java. This is expected to become more popular in the
near future, as there are many more programmers familiar with Java than with proprietary and
old codes unique to specifics brands of microcontrollers. Products whose microcontrollers have
been programmed by Java would be much easier to integrate into a Jini-based network.
Another key move from Sun is the licensing to 80 or so manufacturers to use Java in
consumer products. Some examples include Motorola pagers and cell phones, TCI set-top boxes
for cable TV, Sony audio and video products, and Visa International smart cards. Delphi
Automotive Systems (General Motors) is working on a Java-based system for navigation and
remote diagnostics.
The acceptance of the protocol by OEMs is key for the success. Sun claims to have
currently about 30 companies evaluating and testing the Jini Technology for specific product
opportunities. Among other manufacturers, Sun reports to have on board Sony, Phillips, Axis,
Canon, Computer Associates, Datek, Encanto, Epson, Ericsson, FedEx, Mitsubishi, Norwest
Mortgage, Novell, ODI, Oki, Quantum, Salomon Brothers, Seagate, Nokia and Toshiba. If these
OEMs really emembraces the technology, Sun would have had walked half of the trip to success
(with Jini). Nevertheless, the fact that OEMs are testing Jini does not mean that they will actually
emembrace it; they will have to prove a real market meaning and, if they do not, they would
easily drop it, regardless its performance. These would lead to either, a "The Reign of the
Behemoth" or a "World of the Guerillas" scenario.
The second half of the story is solving the issue of who is going to buy these devices.
Certainly, office networking will be reinvented under the Jini technology. However the real
measure of the wide acceptance and the real test of easy-to-use technology will be "home
networking". Resembling "the kiosk' of Dertouzos, many people have imagined domestic scenes
where a variety of smart devices communicate with each other to make life easier and more fun.
Forrester Research predicts that more than 7% of U.S. homes will have computing
networks by 2002, creating a $1 billion market that year. Some of the driving forces behind this
emergent market are current facts about home electronics. Today more than 20 million U.S.
homes have products like home theater and digital satellite systems that enhance the TV
experience, generating spending of about $5 billion per year. Furthermore, the number of part-
time teleworkers has topped 12 million and continues to expand at a 15% annual rate.
On the other hand, suddenly the boundary between office and the home networking
becomes fuzzy; households with more than one PC will increase from 10.5 million in 1997 to
almost 24 million by the year 2002, reports Forrester Research, and is estimated that 90% of
those households will be on-line.
Some of the drivers that will deploy that growth in home networks will be simplicity and
security of the networks and plug-and-play hardware; Jini can enable both. If these elements are
not present the diffusion of this technology will be slowed down seriously.
Certainly, the first group that would embrace these integration in the market will be those
who are not afraid of new technology. My personal prediction is that those people whose lives
are changed by network computing and spontaneous networking in the working environments,
will be the ones who carry these technological innovations to their homes. If Sun's partnerships
with the OEMs are successful it would be possible to have "The Death of the OS" scenario.
However, if Jini is not able to "grant wishes", the outcome would be a highly risky "Back to the
Lab" scenario in which Sun will have to demonstrate its organizational wisdom and capability to
overcome a false start.
In general it seems like Sun knows perfectly this situation, the fact that they are trying to
develop partnerships with OEMs is and evidence of that. If Sun and the OEMs are able to
capture the niche of the "innovators", and then exploit some specific niches in home usage, such
as security systems, energy saving, and pure "household" applications, the transition of the
technology to the mainstream customers will be easier. OEMs will find a much profitable market
in home networking and the widespread use of networks will mark the new era of home and
office computing.
Let us imagine that positive scenarios are the outcome, the next question is, how Sun
Microsystems will capture the value that is creating.
Value chain under Spontaneous Networking
I have shown the benefits that Jini brings to the consumers, and that the level of
performance achieved in comparison with the current standards in the market. From the Sun's
management point of view, it is important to analyze the value that this innovation will create for
the company.
I will argue that Sun has the possibility to become the computing icon of the first decade
of the New Millenium. While this may sound over optimistic, let us remember that Apple is the
icon of the computer industry of the 80's -it is not necessary to explain the rest of the story.
What I really mean is that, certainly, Sun is about to revolutionize the computer industry,
however, how is Sun going to capture value is a different story. I say, that if this technology
takes off and goes to the mainstream consumer, Sun will make a lot of money. Following I
explain why.
Sun is licensing the technology to OEMs to embed it on various devices. Through
licensing Sun will receive a royalty for every device sold in the market. These loyalties are
estimated to be at around 0.10 USD per device sold if they show a Jini logo outside -or $250,000
per year of use. This implies an appropriability situation where Sun appropriates the value of the
innovation and, in time, frees the complementary assets.
Sun is releasing Jini's code in the new open source-code model used by Linux and
Netscape's Mozilla, and it really is open. Specifications, concepts and standards are already
available, and the first source code was out at the end of 1998.
Sun's goal is for Jini to become a networking standard. It will be used by the JVMs that
are part of Windows 98 and NT, as well as JVMs for UNIX and Macintosh. That sets up a
potential confrontation: Microsoft could provide a deeper, more integrated solution that works
only with its own OS-Windows. Meanwhile, Sun could have a broader solution that works with
all OS but isn't as well integrated with any one-say, Windows.
If that is the case, the technology that was created to open and unite computing may have
precisely the opposite effect, with Microsoft and Sun offering rival infrastructures and
fragmenting the market even further. Of course, they might yet work together to create a simple
networking scheme. This resembles a "The guerilla World Scenario".
In any case Sun would obtain revenues from both, licensing and manufacturing specific
devices for Jini enabled networks, either in work environments and home networking as shown
in the following figure.
Expected Value Chain for Spontaneous Networking under Jini Technology
Direct Revenue to Sun
-Look up Devices
-Specific Software
-Other Hardware
In general Sun is aiming to an architecture strategy pushing Jini as the standard for
networking. This would trigger a complementarily necessity in the market, where the "many to
many" dynamic would be a key driver. The company would allow third parties to develop their
own modules, similar to programmers writing their own Java Virtual Machines today, to
encourage the presence of the technology in the market.
A brief look into the future
A new wave in the computing industry history is about to begin in which Sun could be
one of the greatest winners. The use of OS is now in the verge of being suppressed from the
computing scene. More flexible, open and friendly working environments are enabling new
possibilities for both, end users and system administrators.
However, this wave will not be an isolated movement, nor Sun will be alone. Players
such as Microsoft will try to take advantage of it. Nevertheless, Microsoft will have to reinvent
their business model and try to compete in a new turf. So far, Sun has won an important battle
against Microsoft on Java -through the Department of Justice- that strengthens its position in
Java technology, which is great news to help Jini in its diffusion and appropriability. Also, Sun
will have to watch out for other disruptive technologies, such as networking chips.
It is clear that the success will depend on the strength of the diffusion and the strategies
that Sun design to make Jini the networking standard in the new era of computing. Although it is
hard to predict how many users will be in the near future, some estimation are made and they
seem to be attractive; the speed of diffusion is in part function of how much OEMs embrace the
technology and make it part of their architecture. Developing niches to get into the mainstream
customers is key.
Also, Sun's business with AOL and Netscape is good news; this will push easier Jini and
Java through their corporate software division making and the adoption of these technologies in
the companies' work places faster. I think all this means, a great future for the customers, great
technologies, many alternatives, many possibilities for work and entertainment environments. In
the following chapter I will apply the framework presented in Chapter 3 to identify business
opportunities dealing with the uncertainty created by a disruptive technology such as Jini.
Chapter 6
Applying a Structured Methodological Framework for
Identification of Business Opportunities
In this chapter I will use the analysis made in chapters 5 and 6 and apply the framework
presented in chapter 3. The main objective of this exercise is to show a practical use of the
structured framework for dealing with uncertainty based on the case analysis made about the
disruptions in technology in the computing industry. Certainly, some parts of the example will be
incomplete (business plan, for instance), however, the results are based in true developments in
the industry and should be of use in taking advantage of uncertainty for developing new
businesses. As shown in Chapter 3 the proposed general framework is as follows:
Orranizational Requirements
Strategic Issues Organizational Organizationalfor the Restrictions Capabilities
Analysis of Environmental lezus
'UasOs 3. Uncertainties 3a. Definition of 3b. Business PlanIdentification Future Scenarios Revisited I
Development of New Busineses 1
Environmental Analysis
The first stage of the framework is related to the developments in the environment of an
industry. In this part the relevant trends for a firm should be identified and all its implications
should be laid down. The sequence proposed is as shown in the following methodological
diagram.
1. Selection of Two (Three) relevant trends
2. Identify general implications of each trend
Implications Implications Implications
Tren I :- -::: Trn :- Trn C::Implicationss
implicatioImplicationsnImplications Implications m2al. Combining the trends,
Identify business Opportunities
Based on the analysis made about the computing industry in Chapters 4 and 5 I have
identified three main trends that will drive the industry in the years to come. These trends are:
1. An increased use and diffusion of information appliances for specific
tasks in the mainstream market.
2. A signficant reduction in the dependence of a specifc computing
platform (OS) i.e. cross-platform computing.
3. Increase in the diffusion of network computing.
As I discussed in the latter two chapters, the market dynamics in the computing industry
will go through an important shift in the years to come. The shipments of PCs will decrease and
the sales of information appliances will increase in an important way. This shift will be driven by
the impact of this appliances in trivial tasks that are today performed using PCs; the simplicity of
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this appliances will take over this tasks and more complex systems will be used for more
sophisticated uses.
Activities such as e-mail, access to non-graphic information (stock quotes, etc), personal
organization, etc. will be among the more impacted ones. This, of course, will be driven by the
use of the Internet as a medium to communicate these devices, as already discussed, more access
to the Internet will be made using information appliances.
By the same token, since more information appliances will be in the market and there will
be a higher demand for services in networks, the necessity of having cross-platform equipment
will also be increased. This means that one person using an information appliance and needs to
access a particular service will demand not only simplicity in its own device, but from the
working or networking environment. This implies that many more solutions to have cross
platform interoperability will be demanded in the market; no more "I have to use Windows,
otherwise I won't be able to have access to the network services".
Since many of these appliances will not have enough processing capabilities, the use of
services over a network will be increased. What I mean with this is that a person using an
information appliance with limited processing capacity will be able (and will demand)
processing (or storage) capacity from other devices that will offer the service over a network.
This will steadily increase the demand for a new paradigm such as that proposed for Sun in
which spontaneous networking for accessing services over a network independently of the
appliances platform (OS) is enabled. This will certainly imply a change in the computing
paradigm, as we know it today.
These three trends in the computing industry are closely interrelated, and somehow are a
result of one another. I will show in the following section of the methodological framework that
each of them have specific implications for the industry and the possible new services and
products that can be developed taking advantage of the opportunities.
If these trends hold, the computing industry will certainly go under a dramatic
transformation in the years to come. Thus, the implications of each of these trends for the
industry would be related to all the stakeholders. This means that the impact of the trends will be
felt in how the products are designed, how the consumers perceive the products and how these
products are marketed to the consumers. Inevitably this trends will also modify the business
models in the industry. Following I show which are the most significant implications of each of
the mentioned trends.
+ Implications of "An increased use and diffusion of information appliances for specific
tasks in the mainstream market".
1. Reduction in PC time for simple tasks (e-mail, check movie listings, etc)
2. Need for networks both at home and at office spaces
3. Need for "low-weight" software applications (simplicity)
4. Need for efficient hardware (low use of energy) for mobility
5. Easier access to the Internet
6. Different content oriented services
7. More telecommunication infrastructure needed
8. Increase in the number of users of networked services
9. Lower cost (price) computing devices
10. Increased mobility for users
11. Easier access to on-line services for non-PC users (late adopters)
+ Implications of "A significant reduction in the dependence of a specific computing
platform (OS) i.e. cross-platform computing".
1. Cross platform compatibility marketing
2. Change in business models of firms
3. More software code in open source diffusion (Linux-like availability) model
4. Reduction of many-to-many effect (network externalities)
5. More software applications available
** Implications of "Increase in the diffusion of network computing".
1. Need for common communication protocols
2. Availability of readily to use networking infrastructure (ex: wireless Ethernet)
3. Need for easy-to-use and easy-to-install networks (ex: Ethernet home-packages)
4. More dedicated devices for networking
5. Need for personal software for network administration
6. More telecommunication infrastructure needed
Once the implications of the trends have been identified the next step is to identify
possible business opportunities in the industry, or which type of businesses could be more
successful based on these trends. The outcome of the current analysis could represent either a
diversification or integration for a particular company.
Identifying Business Opportunities
As discussed in Chapter 1 this augmentation in the breadth of the firm's products and
services should be part of a previous strategy revision of the company, in other words, the firm
should have had decided in advance to what extend should diversify or integrate its businesses.
However, independently of the type of the business (in the computing industry three
types of companies are relevant: Software companies, hardware manufacturers and service
providers) the outcomes should be useful in identifying not only new business opportunities
directly for the firm, but new opportunities for establishing partnerships and strategic alliances.
Given the implications of each of the trends, it is possible to identify cross-trend patterns
the lead to define business opportunities. Is important to mention that the resulting opportunities
should be thought with a lot of creativity, therefore, technical constraints should be ignored.
Thus, combining the implications of the trends the following is a partial list of possible business
opportunities.
Software
1. A browser for identifying services in a network from an info-appliance
2. An application to play MPEG layer 3 compressed music files downloaded from the Internet
or "ripped" from the home audio system on a palm size computer
3. An application for remote home administration (utilities, infrastructure, home security
system) for PC or palm size computer
4. Improved voice recognition applications for info appliances leasing computing power from
the local area network
Hardware
1. An attachment for Palm Pilots to allow playing MPEG 3 layer music file (In search for
backwards compatibility)
2. Kiosks for accessing the Internet on the street and public areas from a laptops or info
appliances (palm-size computers, e-books)
3. A global positioning system (GPS) device that also connects to the Internet on the go, for
outdoor enthusiasts, that retrieves maps and information and allows e-mailing
Services
1. Integration and distribution of home networking applications and hardware, aimed to the
mainstream market
2. Integration of commerce services to home networks (grocery stores, video rentals, etc) for
direct ordering
3. A Website for home and info appliances software distribution
It is very important to mention that the partial list of business opportunities shown in the
latter lists are intended to be an example of how to use this framework, it is easily arguable the
validity of some of the ideas. The recommendation that I would make in using this framework is
that a multidisciplinary team should be in charge of generating those lists, therefore, the ideas
would be not only be generated in a more educated way, but generated from different
perspectives of the issues. Particularly, the hardware list is not intended for mentioning all the
info-appliances that are being developed, but to mention possible new types of hardware as the
result of the trends.
Establishing Attributes for Business Opportunities
Once the list of business opportunities, the process requires to select those opportunities
that are aligned to the organization (or investors') strategic requirements, and that may be
possible to develop. The following diagram shows the methodological development of this
section of the framework.
Criteria:
2a2. Select those business 
-Innovative
opportunities that are in line with the -Un-familiar
organizational requierments 'Not necessarily technically feasible
2a3. Define characteristics and technical
requirements: Establish attributes
Product/Service A
Product/Service B
From the list of products above I have selected one (only for exemplification reasons)
which I believe integrates the three types of businesses in the computing industry. In the case of
application of this framework within an organization, it is necessary to select the opportunities
under the scope of the strategic direction of the firm, as well as the possibilities of the
organization to deliver and capture the value of the business.
Although, this exercise should be developed with a high level of creativity it should stay
close to the possibilities of the firm from the organizational and technical point of view. These
attributes should capture elements from the consumer point of view, in other words, to define
which are the technical necessities given the needs of the consumer and then establish the
technical needs for delivering the features. As mentioned in Chapter 5 these is one of the most
important modifications of the industry, to dream up services with consumer value and then
build devices that can deliver them. Following I define the attributes of the business opportunity
as dictated in the framework.
Attributes of "Kiosks for accessing the Internet in the streets or public areas
from laptops or info appliances (palm-size computers, e-books, etc)"
1. Offers security for the user from the digital point of view
2. Offers security for the user from the physical point of view (booth-type to protect
from burglars)
3. Cross-platform
4. Printing services for short documents (e-mail)
5. Wide availability (airports, train stations, public buildings, etc)
6. Access to specific services (airline and train reservation systems, etc)
7. High speed connections
8. Billing of kiosk time usage through user's on-line service provider
9. Wireless, wired and dial-up connections available (wired and wireless Ethernet,
infrared)
10. Easily movable from place to place. Can be used in fairs, conferences, etc.
11. Use of Jini-type technology for plug-and-work and access the kiosk services.
12. Allows multi-users (up to 5 to 10 at one time)
13. Supports all kinds of mobile info appliances with access to online services and the
Internet.
14. Must have computing power and capacity in order to be "leased" from the users'
equipment (Ex: say you want to perform a financial simulation from your Palm Pilot)
15. Must have capacity to make video conferencing based on IP technology
16. Scalable to future technologies
Once defined the business opportunities and its most relevant attributes the next phase is
to develop a complete business plan for the venture. As I have indicated before, it is not the
intention of this thesis to define a methodology for a business plan. However, I will point out
some of the common elements that are included in a business plan, either for a new enterprise or
for developing a business within an organization.
2.b Develop a Business Plan for Each
(or one) of the New Product Services
Business
Plan
Product Business
"A"Plan
Product
"B"9
Typically a business plan for a new venture or product would include the points shown in
the following table. For further reference I would recommend to follow the guidelines suggested
by Geoffrey Timmons in his book " New Venture Creation, Entrepreneurship in the 2 1s"
Century" and the book by Edward B. Roberts, "Entrepreneurs in High Technology, Lessons from
MIT and Beyond".
Although the books mentioned above are oriented for the new venture creation, both
contain important insights for new business development within organizations and should be
useful for different applications.
Sections of a Typical Business Plan for a New Venture
1. Description of Industry, Technology, 2. Entry and growth strategy
Company, Products and/or Services
3. Market Research and Analysis: 4. Economics of the Business:
e Customers and Market Segments Gross and operating margins
* Customer Profiles Profit potential and quality of profit
e Market size and trends Fixed, variable, and semi-variable costs
e Competition and competitive factors Months to breakeven
" Estimated market share and sales Months to positive cash flow
" Ongoing market evaluation
5. Market Plan: 6. Design and development plan:
" Overall marketing strategy e Proprietary technology
e Pricing e Competitive edge
* Sales tactics e Products, product improvements, new
e Service and warranty policies products, and follow-on products
e How to compete with competitors e Special design tools and processes
e Advertising and promotion e Design and development status and
e Distribution channel tasks
e Design and development costs
* Difficulties, risks, and contingency
plans
7. Manufacturing and Operations Plan: 8. Financial Plan:
e Operations overviews Past and current financial statements
e Manufacturing strategy Profit and loss forecasts
* Strategic make-or-buy decisions Pro forma cash flow analysis
e Geographic location Pro forma balance sheets
e Plant, property, and equipment Breakeven chart
* Process technology Cost improvement and control
e Management of inventories Summary of financial plan
e Organization and work force
" Management of quality
e Regulatory and environmental issues
" Operations difficulties, risks, and
contingency plans
9. Critical Risks and Problems 10. Overall schedule
Certainly, at the end of developing a business plan the original business opportunity
could have been changed, which is, by all means, valid and expected. Even more, the next phase
of the process pretends to modify both the business opportunity as well as the business plan. In
the next phase, as shown in the following diagram, the most important uncertainties should be
identified for the new venture. The objective is to define how the future looks, and with that
adjust the strategic plan according to the resulting scenarios.
Evaluating Uncertainties for Business Opportunities
The scenario creation process has been already discussed in Chapter 2, and was applied
in Chapter 4 regarding the new developments in the computing industry; as a matter of fact I will
use the analysis made in Chapter 4 to keep the consistence of the exercise.
3. Identify the two more critical uncertainties
for each new business (Develop this stage
separately for each new business)
Uncertainties 3.a Plot each uncertainty in two axis
Draw the extremes outcomes of each uncertainty
-Create 4 different scenarios combining the two possibilities
of each uncertainty
Scenario I Scenario II
Scenario III Scenario IV
Drawing from the analysis in Chapter 4 the scenario analysis should be as follows.
Key uncertainties:
* If original equipment manufacturers (OEM) will take network computing for
real and will embrace protocols like Jini.
* If movements such as network computing and spontaneous networking turn
out to be the standards of computing in the future.
Possible outcomes:
Support of OEMs (function of market) Evolution of Computing
la. OEMs find that network computing 2a. Network computing technology
is a winner in the market and delivers all its promises: It works.
embrace it (Consumers acceptance:
home networking; reinvention of
the office networking).
lb. Mainstream consumers ignore 2b. Network computing is not effective;
network computing; OEMs do not desktop computing (OS based) stays
embrace it. as the "way of life"
The map of the outcomes of the uncertainties and the four scenarios are shown in the
following chart.
Uncertainties and Scenarios of Network Computing
Network computing a
market winner OEMs
brace it.
Scenario 1:
The Dead of
the OS
Network
computing
Technology
works
Scenario 3:
The Guerilla
World
Ne
Scenario 2:
Back to the
Lab
Network
Computing
technology
ineffective
Scenario 4:
The Reign of
the Behemoth
twork computing ignored
y mainstream customers;
OEMs do not brace it.
Once the scenarios have been defined, it is necessary to characterize them as indicated in
the methodological diagram below.
3bl. Describe each scenario, define a
story (a future world)
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario [I Scenario IV
* _ _ _ _ _ _
* _ _ _ _ _ _
*_ _ _ _ __ _
* _ _ _ _ _ _
*_ _ _ _ __ _
*_ _ _ _ __ _
*_ _ _ _ __ _
3blEstablish the
implications of
each scenario for
the new business
3b2 Revise the
business plan
establishing strategic
contingency plans,
adjusting financial
assumptions and
adjusting concepts
I Roll the New Business
Since these scenarios have been already analyzed in Chapter 4, I will point out the main
ideas of each of them and emphasize the impact on the new venture selected for the exercise.
Scenario 1: The Death of the OS.
* Wide acceptance of network computing
+ Great performance of the new technology
+ Customers are no longer obliged to buy a specific OS
+ Computers do not have OS, run little code in the CPU and share computing
capabilities
+ Success in homes and working environments
+ Reduction of the OS's value
+ Common use of info appliances enabled for spontaneous networking
Business
Man
Proditet
Re8isite
Scenario 2: Back to the Lab.
* Acceptance of distributed computing capabilities is greatly embraced by the
market.
O EMs manufacture enabled devices, performance is poor.
4 The acceptance of the technology by mainstream customers is delayed
* Microsoft applies FUD techniques (Fear, uncertainty and Doubt)
+ A transitional scenario
Scenario 3: The Guerilla World.
4 Mainstream customers do not find the technology useful
4 Technology performs very well.
1 Competitive environment that resembles the "guerilla" wars
+ "Niche" driven market.
+ Some new OEMs embraces the technology
Scenario 4: The Reign of the Behemoth.
+ Complete failure of the technology
+ Lack of diffusion in the market
4 Microsoft will take advantage of it, reinventing its business without losing
market share and using its muscle to give credibility for the technology using
its brand name.
The next step is to analyze what is the meaning of each of these scenarios to the
identified venture. In the following matrix I will try to establish these implications. Some of
these implications have already been discussed in the latter chapters, however I believe that it is
important to put them in the context of this framework.
Implications for "Kiosks for accessing the Internet in the
streets or public areas from laptops or info appliances
Scenarios (palm-size computers, e-books, etc)"
1. The Death of the OS. Favorable:
" Availability of off-the-shelf technology for integration
m A growing market of info-devices, therefore a need for
access to on-line services
a Growing need of info devices to perform sophisticated
tasks
" Availability of protocols to serve different platforms
Unfavorable:
E Rapid improvements on info devices including wireless
communications
N Easier access from individual devices to on-line services
2. Back to the Lab. Favorable:
" Consumers understand the concept and wait for
improvements of the underlying technologies
e Many companies try to win the early race, therefore
many protocols and technologies are available
Unfavorable:
* Some consumers do not trust the service and walk to
other alternatives, such as wireless communications and
stick to computing power in their laptops
3. The Guerilla World. Favorable:
" There is available technology
* Services may be embraced by some innovators and early
adopters (niche driven market)
Unfavorable:
" Since there is no mainstream market consumers the
original concept of services in public areas has to be
changed
" Hard to bring credibility back
4. The Reign of the Favorable:
Behemoth. 0 In the next wave some technologies may appear
Unfavorable:
" Time to market of the concept is too long and may be
too late to introduce any service
" Hard to bring credibility back
An important threat for this type of equipment (the "kiosk") is the increasing importance
of wireless technology that would enable mobile equipment to connect direct to dial-up services
or to download messages from on-line services. In this case the value of a booth to connect a
variety of devices to the Internet or other on-line services would be seriously reduced.
The value of the kiosk, in a wireless world, would be circumscribed to devices that did
not have wireless communication capabilities or for computing tasks (one of the desired
attributes). As a matter of fact, as of today the only equipment with wireless capabilities to
connect to the Internet are digital PCS (Personal Communication Systems) based services,
basically cellular phones and paging services. However the connection have to be made through
a specific service provider and the small screens in the phones are uncomfortable for the user to
read e-mails or browse the Internet.
I foresee convergence of wireless and portable computing technologies into two basic
devices: a small, digital, sleek wireless phone, whose primary appeal is weight and convenience;
and a handheld data device combining computing power with two-way data capability for non-
voice communication and net access supported by a developed telecommunications
infrastructure.
Furthermore, almost every house with a PC has a television, and the most wired
consumers of tomorrow will want both their PCS handset and a handheld computer with two-
way data capability. The industry recognizes the trend; Motorola is only one of several
companies selling a Palm Pilot pager card, for example, and Microsoft is aggressively pushing
CE into the wireless space.
In the light of the discussion on wireless technology I would rescue from the original list
of business opportunities the following ideas to be included in a similar analysis:
*. A browser for identifying services in a network from an info-appliance
4* An application for remote home administration (utilities, infrastructure, home
security system) for PC or palm size computer
Both business opportunities would be very close related to a Jini-type technology and
would be very well suited in a "Death of the OS" scenario, where network computing is widely
used using desktop devices or hand-held computers.
In any case I would argue that the kiosk would have a short life until the technologies in
dispute get settled and in the mean time would be a device of use that will evolve into other
services. Even more important the kiosk has accomplished its mission in serving as a small case
study for demonstrating the use of the methodological framework.
After the discussion about the impact of the future scenarios on the venture the next task
is to modify the business plan developed for the new venture, which certainly is not a trivial one,
in fact is critical, however is not in the scope of this work. I would encourage the reader to take
advantage of this thesis and expand it to other areas.
Final thoughts
I belong to a generation that likes to think is living in the fastest paced time in history;
that changes are more rapid that ever; that uncertainty is the hallmark of "our days" and that "our
days" are far more exciting than those of our preceding generations. My generation also likes to
think that, now more than ever, technology empowers us, makes our living better every day and
that the future looks brighter than ever. My parents' generation had a similar perception, so did
my grandparents'.
The reality is that we have been living in an incremental innovation time and, certainly,
these innovations have changed significantly the way we live. However, the changes that the
generations at early 1900's went through were far more dramatic. Rapid travel, communications,
imaging, sound recording, transportation machines (trains, ocean liners and cars), etc., were
innovations that appeared at the end of the 1800's and truly changed the way that generation was
living. We have been living in a pattern that began a century ago. We have been actually refining
those innovations.
But let me give some credit to my generation. We have started trends were frontiers are
less significant. Computing and communications infrastructure is changing dramatically the way
each of us interact with the rest of the world. Information (and consequently business and
financial sectors) is going beyond governmental boundaries and controls. In fact, both,
computing and communications are converging into one force. Indeed, it is really difficult to
forecast were the world is going. I believe that my children's generation will see far more
dramatic changes from those that I have seen.
Now, more than ever, is important to learn from the past, to understand that there are
certain type of phenomena that repeats again and again; it is crucial for us to understand which
are the forces behind change and to establish simple, comprehensive ways to put things in
perspective. The work that I tried to do in this thesis is precisely aimed to this. I did not pretend
to develop a sophisticated way of evaluating uncertainty, but to develop a simple framework to
integrate different insights from the environment of an industry and developing new businesses.
For the case analysis in this theses I chose Sun's Jini technology because is the promise
of a better industry. A technology oriented to put computing and communications infrastructure
at service of people and liberate us from the brittleness of today's model. I do not know if Sun's
product is going to succeed. What I know is that is the beginning of a new era in computing, an
era that I wish had arrived earlier.
The results of applying the proposed framework to the case are certainly arguable. I
would not dare to say that the outcomes are winners in a new market, however, the information
for the developing the analysis came from a documented sources and that concepts as those
described would exist in a near future, in a somewhat different shape. In fact, after writing those
sections I jumped into two start-up companies working in surprisingly similar concepts.
It is my hope that anyone who reads this document will be a critic and that, somehow, the
criticisms lead to new findings and improvements. I hope that further work is done and that these
works help my generation to build a better world for the ones to come.
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